A political crisis of longstanding duration has been brought to the
world’s attention by the actions of a competitor at the recently concluded
Olympic Games. Marathon runner Feyisa Lilesa’s gesture of raising his arms
aloft in the form of a cross as he was about to confirm his silver-medal
position was a politically-motivated one intended to highlight the plight of
the Oromo people of Ethiopia who vehemently claim to be perpetually
marginalised by the country’s central government. The Oromo also claim to be
the primary victims of an escalating crackdown on public dissent. But while the
Ethiopian government strenuously contests the facts and figures behind each
repeated claim by local human rights groups and international non-governmental
organisations of mass incarcerations, torture and extra-judicial killings, the
picture emerges of a nation perennially at struggle in the quest towards
achieving a genuine democracy and the rule of law. Whatever the merits of the
arguments positing the clash of ethnic interests, ideological fractiousness and
contestation of social policy, Ethiopia’s political history is one that is
replete with episodes of ethnic or ideologically-motivated dissent which have
typically been met by violent counter-reactions on the part of those wielding
the levers of central power; whether by its overthrown monarchy or by its
military and civilian successors. The iron-fisted approach to managing the
affairs of state adopted by successive Ethiopian governments has always been
predicated on the idea of preserving a multi-ethnic polity seemingly at any
cost, much to the extent that the critics of the present administration accuse
it of being insensitive to the genuine grievances of its citizens and of being
unable to appropriately distinguish between protest and insurrection. This
heavy-handed approach, some commentators contend risks plunging Ethiopia into a
serious ethnic-based conflict that would not only mirror the violent
transformations in its own recent history but which may also undertake the devastating
features of conflicts as have occurred in neighbouring Sudan and Somalia and
even Rwanda.
When
Ethiopian rebels succeeded in overthrowing the hardline Marxist regime of
Mengistu Haile Mariam in 1991, the succeeding political framework, that of a
federation of nine ethnically-based states, was hailed as a model for the
African continent. The constitution granted autonomy to the constituent parts
of the country and included a clause providing for the right to secede. The
apparent success of this system, apart from the separation of Eritrea, was
according to Meles Zenawi, evidence of “the successful management of our
diversity.”
Zenawi, the
leader of the Tigrean People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) which defeated
Mengistu’s forces, had been speaking as prime minister twenty years later.
Under his leadership, Ethiopia’s marked development of infrastructure was
accompanied by official data indicating consistent annual economic growth. A
poverty assessment provided by the World Bank in 2011 found that poverty had
fallen in the country from 44 percent in 2000 to 30 percent in 2011. The report
also stated that average household health, education, and living standards had
improved over the same period of time. The regime received a boost in July of
2015 when on a state visit US President Barack Obama had repeatedly referred to
the “democratically elected” government of Ethiopia.
Nonetheless
the apparent progress made in development and democracy under Zenawi’s
Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) has for long been
underplayed by the opposition. They charge that the theoretically impressive
constitutional arrangements were negated by the authoritarian nature of Zenawi
-who died in 2012 after 21 years as leader- and continues to be undermined by
his chosen successor, Hailemariam Desalegn. The true state of affairs according
to Bulcha Demeksa, an outspoken opposition figure, is that the federal powers
designated to the regions have been effectively usurped by the national
government; claiming at the time Zenawi was in power that he removed regional
presidents “at will”.
There is much
in the way of evidence of the authoritarian ways of the Ethiopian government,
dominated by the EPRDF, since the deposing of the Mengistu regime. This came
into sharp focus at the time of multi-party elections held in 2005. The
opposition’s complaints of election fraud were backed by the view of election
observers from the European Union and the Carter Center. The elections of 2010,
was also mired by claims of voter intimidation while that of 2015, which saw
the EPRDF winning a landslide of 500 out of the 547 available seats -with its
allies winning the remaining 47- was described by the opposition as an
“undemocratic disgrace” and offered proof that Ethiopia is “effectively a
one-party state”. The result is that not a single opposition member presently
sits in the Parliament of the country possessing Africa’s second largest
population.
The EPRDF is
also in full control of the security apparatus. The military, the police force
and the intelligence services, dominated by ethnic Tigrayans, serve as ultimate
guarantors of its survival. The government has also made use of vaguely drafted
counter-terrorism laws to clamp down on dissent. An article in the European
Scientific Journal published in January 2016 claimed that at least eleven
journalists had been convicted and sentenced to periods in excess of ten years
since the enactment of Ethiopia’s Proclamation on Anti-Terrorism in August of
2009. Whereas the situation before the passing of the anti-terrorism
legislation was that no laws contained provisions overtly criminalising the
standard activities of opposition journalists and politicians, Article 6 of the
Proclamation typifies the draconian nature of the law by allowing for a
broad-brush policy which enables the authorities to interpret all manner of
activities as ‘encouraging terrorism’ by direct or indirect means. It is a tool used to diminish freedom of
speech, association and assembly by criminalising the role of opposition
politicians, journalists and bloggers, as well as the work of environmental and
human rights activists. This view is supported by the United States State
Department which in April of 2016 called
for an end to the government’s use of the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation law “to
prosecute journalists, political party members and activists”.
Another piece
of allegedly ‘anti-democratic’ legislation among a welter passed during this
period was the Charities and Societies Proclamation of 2008. This restricts
Ethiopian non-governmental organizations from embarking on any human
rights-related work if they receive their funding from foreign sources.
Critics of
the government also point to its brutal handling of recalcitrant populaces in
various regions much to the extent that certain external human right
organisations such as Genocide Watch and Human Rights Watch have alleged that
the consistent use of lethal force and other extreme measures in the provinces
are fulfilling a range of criteria which when taken in sum are considered to
amount to genocide. This applies to the Anuak people of Gambella province as
well as to the inhabitants of the regions of Ogaden and Oromia.
The Oromo,
the largest ethnic group in Ethiopia who comprise around a third of the country’s
population, have consistently complained of being marginalised in a country
where the exercise of political power is traditionally viewed through the prism
of the rivalry between the Amhara and Tigrayan ethnic groups. A 2009 report by
the Advocates for Human Rights organisation documented a historical account of
consistent human rights abuse against Oromo communities by three successive
regimes: that of the Haile Selassie-led monarchy, the Marxist Derg of the
Mengistu era and the present EPRDF government. Oromo groups often characterise
the treatment meted to their communities as an enduring form of state
sanctioned tyranny. In October of 2014, Amnesty International produced ‘Because
I am Oromo: Sweeping repression in the Oromia region of Ethiopia’, a 166-page
document which asserted that between 2011 and 2014, at least 5,000 Oromos had
been arrested based “on their actual or suspected peaceful opposition to the
government.” This frequently involved taking pre-emptive action. Dissenters,
both actual and suspected, it claimed had been “detained without charge or
trial (and) killed by security services during protests, arrests and in
detention.”
The Ogaden
region, scene of a large scale battle between the armies of Ethiopia and
Somalia between 1977 and 1978, is composed of ethnic Somalis, a great many of
whom live impoverished lives in an underdeveloped expanse of land which is
richly endowed with oil and gas resources. Its people also accuse the national
government of severe human rights abuses including enforced displacements from
ancestral land, restriction of large groups to camps, starvation and massacres
of civilians and suspected militants. The management of a blockade of the
region and the camps established for internally displaced person has involved
regulating the availability of food and water. It has meant starvation while
rape and intimidation are claimed to be weapons used by the Ethiopian military
in keeping the people in line who have suffered from dispossession of their
lands which have been turned over to Chinese-run oil and gas projects.
The Anuak of
the Gambella region, a resource rich and fertile area which is situated to the
west of the country on the border with Sudan, have also suffered from
government policies. The region does not appear to benefit from the oil and
agricultural projects the government has leased to foreign interests. Instead
this mainly pastoral people, dark-skinned Africans traditionally treated as
inferiors by the lighter-hued Highlanders, have suffered from enforced displacement
from their lands and were subjected to a notorious series of massacres by the
army and Highlander militias in the early 2000s.
The case made
against the Ethiopian regime is both frequent and compelling. Nonetheless,
context is required before reaching a final judgement. Ethiopia, is the
descendant state of a multi-ethnic empire with a remarkably turbulent history.
Although seen by outsiders as an Abyssinian entity with an Orthodox Christian
identity, the Amhara,Tigrayan and others of the Habesha ethnic strain amount to no more than 35% of a total
population which accommodates over 80 different ethnic groups. Further,
although it vies with Armenia for the honorific of the first Christian nation,
nearly 45% of Ethiopians practise the Islamic faith.
It is under
these circumstances that in the cause of maintaining its nationhood that
Ethiopia has arguably inevitably developed a brand of authoritarian leadership;
one which is perhaps synonymous with the Russian concept of zheleznaya ruka (or silnaya ruka): rule by the iron fist. Such a rationale will of
course be of cold comfort to those groups such as the Oromo who although
forming part of the lineage of the imperial family (both of Emperor Haile
Selassie’s parents were paternally of Oromo descent) have had to endure
restrictions on forms of their cultural expression; a culture based before
incorporation into the Abyssinian empire on the Gadaa system which they proudly hold to be an exemplar of
traditional democratic social, political and economic governance. The parallel
institution of Siqque is claimed to
have promoted gender equality.
In 2010, the
Economic Intelligence Unit described the Ethiopian government as an
“authoritarian regime” when ranking the country in 118th place out of 167 on
its ‘Democracy Index’. If the present rulers of Ethiopia do privately admit to
the necessity of conducting the task of nation building with a strong hand,
they should be aware both of the limits of its severity and of the need to
reassure their countrymen by demonstrable policies that their governace is not
predicated on the perpetuation of a form of ethnic hegemony. For it is the
argument of many of its sternest critics that the EPRDF is dominated by the
TPLF which as a guerilla force played the decisive role in defeating the
Mengistu government and gaining effective control of the country. They only
need to look at their history and that of Ethiopia to be aware of the dialectic
of violence that is inevitably unleashed when the hatred and injustice borne of
ethnic chauvinism exceeds the limits of tolerance. The Woyane Rebellion of 1943
in Tigray province which was eventually crushed was one which was directed at
the Amhara-centred regime of Selassie. And it was a coalition of ethnic
militias which conducted the fight against the tyrannical rule of Mengistu.
It would be
remiss to fail to elaborate further on the achievements of the EPRDF alluded to
earlier in regard to the reduction of poverty as well as improvements in both
health and education. High on the list of projects which if brought to fruition
would serve to be genuinely transformative in its effect is that of the 4.2
billion dollar Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). This 6,000 megawatt
gravity dam situated on the Blue Nile will be the largest hydro-electric dam on
the African continent. It is being constructed under a longstanding threat of
war by Egypt, a country which relies heavily on the waters of the River Nile.
But the Ethiopian government is dogged in its pursuit of a scheme which has the
potential to bring a great many of its citizens out of poverty.
The
government’s Productive Safety Net Programme through which people can work on
public infrastructure projects in return for food or cash provides jobs for
around 7 million people. The effects of drought are combatted with more
effectiveness than previous regimes through a national food reserve and early
warning system located in all the woredas,
that is, local government districts. There have also been productive
initiatives made in relation to tackling the spread of HIV/AIDS.
Alongside the
iron-fisted style of governace is some evidence of flexibility. The so-called
‘Master Plan’ aimed at extending the capital city of Addis Ababa was scrapped
in the face of protests from the Oromo community who viewed it as a ploy by
other ethnic groups to uproot them from their fertile land under the guise of
development. In an unprecedented display of independence, the Oromo component
of the EPRDF, the Oromo People’s Democratic Organisation (OPDO) announced in
January of 2016 that it was resolved to “fully terminate” the plan.
The
government has also shown a good level of resolve in asserting Ethiopian
national interests; its defiance of Egyptian attempts at intimidation over the
GERD project being a notable example. And while the legislative stipulation
contained within the Charities and Societies Proclamation regarding funding
from external sources appears primarily geared towards stifling internal
dissent, it can also be viewed as a prudent act aimed at protecting the
Ethiopian state from foreign interference of the sort that has enabled
intelligence services of certain countries to utilise non-governmental
organisations to destablise other nations. The successful rescue by Ethiopian
defence forces of Aneuk children abducted by members of the south Sudanese
Murle tribe in the Gambella region where groups of Murle had massacred hundreds
of people was also a laudable act done in the national interest. The country is
shaping itself in a position to be a key player in regional affairs with its
expected role as energy supplier to its neighbours as well as through its
peacekeeping efforts under the auspices of the African Union
That said, it
is also clear that the heavy-handed approach to governace needs moderating lest
it succeeds in triggering an uncontainable level of violence. Violence is of
course a phenomenon to which generations of Ethiopians are familiar with.
The pattern
of intermittent bloody insurrections and coups against the old imperial regime
continued under its successor, a military regime whose initially bloodless coup
which overthrew the monarchy in 1974 transmogrified into a train of unceasing
violence. Commencing with what came to be known as ‘Black Saturday’, it was
followed by the internecine struggles within the junta, known by the amharic
word for ‘committee’, the Derg. The assassinations first of General Aman Andom
and later Tafari Benti paved the way for the rise of Mengistu as the overseer
of the ‘Ethiopian Red Terror.’ During this period, in which between 30,000 and
750,00 were killed, Mengistu fought an internal war against two civilian
Marxist parties: the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party (EPRP) and the
All-Ethiopia Socialist Movement (MEISON). It is worth noting that the Ethiopian
Civil War which concluded with the 1991 sacking of the Mengistu regime is
officially designated as having started in September of 1974. Since that time,
the government has had to cope with a range of low-intensity insurgencies which
presently number ten.
The onus is
on the government to begin to mould a genuinely inclusive national philosophy
which eschews the perennial preoccupation with securing and maintaining ethnic
hegemony. The country needs to evolve beyond the present facade of federalism,
for there is ample evidence of truth in the cynical interpretation of Zenawi’s
words on the “successful management of our diversity” as a euphemism for the
successful supervision of a divide and conquer strategy. An inability to tackle
ethnic grievances risks plunging Ethiopia into a level of darkness commensurate
with or even exceeding that which occurred during the Rwandan genocide. The
monopoly of state arms on the part of one ethnic group offers no guarantee of
continued peaceful co-existence among Ethiopia’s disparate ethnic groups if
those on the receiving end perceive their national army to be an ‘interahamwe’
of sorts.
If not
corrected, Ethiopia risks ratcheting the dialectic of violence to a level which
would imperil its continued existence.
© Adeyinka
Makinde (2016)
Adeyinka
Makinde is a London-based writer and Law Lecturer with a research interest in
intelligence and security.
