The
civil war which has raged in Syria for a period exceeding a two year mark has
now entered what will be its decisive phase. This will determine whether the
government headed by Bashar al Assad will prevail or be dislodged.
It
will also determine whether any military action undertaken by the United States
will meet a response of critical counter measures by Russia; the nature of
which could put both nations on to the dangerous path of a possible
confrontation.
It
will finally determine whether the conflict will lead to a full blown regional
war; the denouement of which will reveal the viability of the continued existence
of Syria as a nation state.
The
key to understanding this particular conflict and its significance is to keep
in mind what ultimately lies at its root: the confrontation between the United
States and its old adversary, the Islamic Republic of Iran.
While
grievances, dissatisfactions, and dissenting sentiments did exist among
segments of the civil population over the decades-long authoritarian tendencies
of the incumbent rulers who are largely drawn from the minority Alawite group,
the extent of the current insurrection -some would proffer that it should be
more accurately labelled an invasion- could not have attained this level of
magnitude without the active manipulations of foreign state actors; each with a
vested interest in ensuring the effective neutralisation and overthrow of the
Assad government and even, ultimately, the dismemberment of the Syrian state.
Turkey,
for over a decade under the ‘soft-Islamist’ governance of the Justice and
Development Party led by Recep Erdogan, has exhibited foreign policy
inclinations which some have interpreted as harking back to its Ottoman past,
while the conservative Sunni Kingdoms on the Arabian peninsula led by Saudi
Arabia and Qatar are keen on curtailing what is seen as the surgent power and
influence of Shiadom.
This
power and influence as articulated through the respective roles of Iran, Syria
and the Lebanese organisation Hezbollah, has often been referred to as the
‘Shia Crescent.’ It is an alliance which poses a threat not only to the aforementioned
Sunni Kingdoms but also to the United States and to the state of Israel.
American
antagonism towards Iran of course dates back to 1979 with the assumption to
power of the Islamic regime led by Ayatollah Khomeini in the period which
followed the revolution that overthrew the rule of the American-backed Shah.
Iranians
in turn recalled that the first democratically elected government in Iran; that
of Mohamed Mossadegh, was in 1953 overthrown by a coup d’etat which was orchestrated by America’s Central
Intelligence Agency.
This
animus continued through the Iran hostage crisis when American embassy staff
were seized by Iranian revolutionary guards and held hostage and continued
during the 1980s during US intervention in the Lebanon as well as the 8-year
Iraq-Iran War in which the Americans backed Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi dictator
who was the aggressor in that conflict.
This
mutual hostility has persisted right to the present day and although the major
enemy following the September 11 attacks of 2001 was the Sunni-created al Qaeda
which established a presence in Iraq during an insurgency by Sunnis, by 2006,
the administration of President George W. Bush had reconfigured its priorities
to clandestinely work with and enhance the capabilities of Sunni militant
groups in both Lebanon and Syria with the aim of weakening Hezbollah, the Assad
government and ultimately Iran.
This
premise, that the fall of Syria under the control of the Baathist government of
Assad has been a foreign policy objective of the United States has found
expression in a number of policy documents and think-tanks including, most
notoriously, that produced by the Project for the New American Century.
This
neo-conservative group proposed that the United States needed to take advantage
of a post-Cold War world in which a vacuum had been left by the disintegration
of the Soviet Union.
In
shaping the global framework to its advantage, the United States needed to
bolster its military expenditure and resolutely “challenge” regimes which were
hostile to its “interests and values”. Featured among the list of hostile
states were Iraq, Syria and Iran.
The
election of George W. Bush brought neo-Conservatives to influential positions
and ensured the beginning of a process which is continuing to the present.
Retired
General Wesley Clarke, the former supreme commander of NATO, would later
describe how on a visit to the Pentagon after the September 11th
attacks, former colleagues had alerted him to the existence of a memorandum
spelling out how the United States was going to “take out seven countries in
five years.” These he revealed to be Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Somalia,
Sudan and “finishing off” with Iran.
There
are increasingly many who are disinclined to subscribe wholeheartedly –if at
all- to the reasons given for United States-led or backed interventions under
the guise of the phenomena styled respectively as the ‘War on Terror’ and the
‘Arab Spring’.
While
overtly predicated on issues related to countering terrorism or protecting
populations or spreading democracy, each operation has had either an
ascertainable economic motive or is one based on the long term national
objective of effecting the downfall of a regime identified as been “hostile” to
American interests.
By
exploiting the apparently genuinely peaceful civil demonstrations which had developed
in early 2011 while the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ was in full bloom through
covert support for the contrived opposition ‘Free Syrian Army’, the Syrian conflict
has brought the Arab world to the precipice of a potentially catastrophic clash
between Sunni and Shia denominations of the Islamic faith.
But
if the eventuality of a regional sectarian confrontation was not among the desired
outcomes envisaged by the policy-makers of the United States, it is safe to
assert that the deliberate exacerbation of ethnic-religious tensions within a
nation of which affairs the United States is attempting to influence has become
a time-honoured technique utilized by its intelligence agencies.
It
was a tactic which was employed with brutal finesse via Shia-dominated police death
squads in Iraq which were trained and funded to aid in the neutralisation of
the Sunni-led anti-American insurgency as well as in the training and arming of
the Islamist and tribally-motivated rebels who succeeded in overthrowing the
government of Muamar Gaddafi.
While
Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Qatar have provided logistical points for the
transport of arms, the provision of the mercenary component of the anti-Assad
forces and funding, the United States has served as an overseer.
For
instance, in March of this year, a number of Western newspapers reported the
shipment of several thousand tonnes of weapons from Zagreb to conduit nations
in aid of what were referred to as “Syrian militants”. This transaction was said to have been paid
for by the Saudis and Qataris at the behest of the United States.
Ever
mindful of the humiliations and other depredations potentially attendant to
direct interventions, this sort of discreet, ‘at-arms-length’ operation is one
favoured by the United States government as a ploy that is aimed at flagrantly circumventing
domestic legislation geared towards restraining foreign entanglements through
the funding and training of external belligerents.
But
the camouflage which worked in the endeavour to overthrow Libya’s Gaddafi has
failed to work in the case of Syria. The difficulty of achieving this was
quietly acknowledged right at the onset of the conflict.
For
one, the strength of the Syrian armed forces in terms of manpower and weaponry
rendered any attempt at undermining its government an altogether different
proposition from that of Colonel Gaddafi who purposely maintained a smaller,
relatively lightly armed army as a strategy for lessening the chances of a
successful military putsch from among the ranks of his soldiers.
Secondly,
both the Russians and Chinese who felt deceived by consenting to what they were
led to believe was intended to be a vastly more limited form action under the
United Nations ‘Responsibility to Protect’ doctrine in Libya, have remained
unyielding in blocking American attempts to give NATO a UN-stamped green light
to embark on a direct form of intervention.
Nevertheless,
there is every reason to believe that the US-led coalition of anti-Assad
nations made undisclosed time-based projections that the pressures caused by
covertly building up the capabilities of the Syrian opposition forces, an
expected mass defection from the ranks of the Syrian military, as well as an
intensification of sectarian animosities leading to the mass estrangement of
the majority Sunnis from the national government would have by now led to the fall
of Assad.
The
frustration at failing to achieve this end has revealed itself in a number of
incidents which bore the hallmarks of having been opportunely stage managed.
In
June of 2012, the shooting down by a Syrian anti-aircraft battery of a Turkish
air force jet which was manoeuvring on the border of both countries and which had
likely strayed into Syrian airspace appeared designed to serve as a means of
invoking Article 5 of NATO’s constitution which provides that an attack on one
member state is considered as an attack against all.
Again
the media debate which followed the explosion back in April of a weapon
believed to contain chemical agents and the subsequent vigorous examination of
President Barack Obama’s previous enunciation that the use of such weapons
would represent the crossing of a ‘red line’ which would necessitate the use of
American military power appeared to represent an aggressive surge to facilitate
public approval for intervention.
With
the drift of the conflict swaying decisively in favour of the Assad army, which
with a contingent force of Hezbollah fighters scored a decisive victory in June
over the opposition at the Syrian-Lebanese border town of Qusair, the stakes
became much higher.
The
waning of the opposition which itself is bedevilled by the al Qaeda
affiliations of the Jabhat al Nusra Front and the Islamic State in Iraq as well
as allegations of and the confirmed instances of perpetrated atrocities effectively
put the pressure on the United States to intervene.
This
is why the nerve agent attack on Ghouta, a community to the east of Damascus on
August 21st which killed anything from 350 to over a thousand people,
has come at a time which can only be described as been particularly propitious.
Why,
many have asked, would the ascendant forces of the Assad government resort to
the use of chemical weapons given that the advantage is with them? Why would they
use them when in full knowledge that the United States would seize upon such
use as a justification for finally intervening in a direct manner?
In
many ways the conflict has built up to this moment. The failure of the efforts
to destroy the Assad government has forced the hand of the United States to
intervene based on an event which was either a tragedy staged with the specific
purpose of blaming the Syrian government for using chemical weapons or even if
the Assad regime was responsible, is an intervention based on an uncertain
aspect of international law.
For
while the Chemical Weapons Convention does outlaw the use of chemical weapons there is
not an unequivocally concomitant provision entitling foreign intervention by
means of invasion or using punitive measures to deal with transgressors.
The
evidence proffered by the Obama administration has not been particularly
convincing; amounting to little more than “only the Assad government was
capable of deploying and using such weapons.”
Evidence
indicates that this is not true.
For
instance, last May, there were reports from the Turkish media indicating that
the authorities had found a 2 kilogram cylinder of sarin nerve gas after
searching the homes of Islamist Syrian guerrillas.
There
is no great mystery or complexity about the adaptation of chemicals to weaponry
which can come pre-packaged and be loaded onto an array of conventional guns or
rocket launchers.
There
is the allegation, based on interviews conducted by an AP-affiliated journalist,
that the nerve agents which were used in Ghouta had been supplied by Saudi
Arabian intelligence. And in August, Syrian state television broadcast footage
of soldiers finding chemical agents in rebel tunnels in the Damascus suburb of
Jobar.
Further,
the Syrian ambassador to the UN has called for a United Nations investigation
into three alleged chemical weapons attacks against its soldiers which occurred
in August. The United States, it needs reminding, has never stipulated any
measures that it would take against the opposition if it resorted to chemical
warfare.
Although
sound in principle, the idea of striking out at those who use chemical weapons
in order to serve as a deterrence is one which is not strictly proportionate in
terms of the damage inflicted on humans by other forms of weapons which have
been used by the armed forces of the United States, Russia and Israel.
In
Iraq, babies continue to be born deformed as a result of the agents contained
in American bombs used during the Gulf War. There were no red lines drawn when
Israel used phosphorous agents and depleted uranium shells in Lebanon and in
Gaza.
There
are those who also assert that the United States policy on chemical weapons as
been inconsistent if not reeking of hypocrisy given that the Iraqi army under Saddam
Hussein used chemical weapons with impunity against Iranian soldiers during the
war in which it had sponsored Saddam.
It
would be remiss not to mention the role of Israel as a key party with a huge
interest in the fate of the Assad government and of the future of Syria itself.
The impression which has been given by much of the media is that Israel has
been somewhat passive over the conflict raging inside one of its neighbours and
that it is unsure of which side it would prefer to prevail.
Although
much of the analysis has portrayed an attitude of studied weariness over the
outcome; with many assuming that it would prefer Assad to remain in power as it
is “better the devil you know than the one you don’t know”, such conclusions
amount to a gross misreading of the situation.
Here,
an understanding of history and the fundamental precepts which have shaped and
guided the longstanding attitudes and policies of the Zionist state are
critical.
It
was of course the New Zionist Revisionism as enunciated by Ze’ev Jabotinksy
through his Iron Wall Doctrine which asserted that the viability and the
sustenance of a nascent Jewish state nestled among hostile Arab neighbours
could only be accomplished by foregoing notions of compromise and instead
adopting a bullish and brutal military culture which would crush the will of
those who would offer resistance.
Part
of the strategy of dealing with the challenge associated with surrounding Arab
nations was that the Zionist state must assume a position of undisputed
hegemony which would be accomplished not only by force of arms but by
exploiting the differences between and the disagreements among her neighbours.
And
as the breaking up of the Ottoman Empire would serve as a pre-condition for the
establishment of a state of Israel, so it was argued that its survival would be
better assured by the weakening of successor artificially constructed Arab
states, which should be broken down into smaller, weaker mini-states.
In
other words, the existence of large Arab nation states from the Maghreb to the
Levant would always represent a potential threat to Israel which should be
neutralised when opportunities arise.
This
line of thinking was at the heart of David Ben Gurion’s policies in the 1950s
which sought to exacerbate tensions between Christians and Muslims in the
Lebanon for the fruits of acquiring regional influence by the dismembering the
country and the possible acquisition of additional territory. It formed the
basis of his vehement objections to Charles de Gaulle’s decision to grant independence
to Algeria.
It
was certainly at the heart of the plan of policy drawn up by one Oded Yinon in
the 1980s. The ‘Yinon Plan’ strategized a vision by which the ethnic-tribal
rivalries and the economic maladies within larger Arab states should be exploited
to the extent of creating the conditions by which the balkanization of such
states could be achieved.
Thus
the plan elaborated on designs for specific countries such as Iraq which would
ideally be divided into three mini-states: one Kurdish and the other two Arab
of which one would be Sunni and the other Shia. For Egypt, the most populous
Arab nation, the best case scenario was that of a Coptic Christian state and
numerous other Muslim states.
Addressing
the potentially fractious state of affairs in its north eastern neighbour,
Yinon’s essay noted that “Syria is fundamentally no different from Lebanon
except in the strong military regime which rules it”.
A
continuum of this thinking is apparent in ‘A Clean Break: A New Strategy for
Securing the Realm’, a policy document produced by a team led by Richard Perle
in 1996 for then serving prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Perle, it should be
noted, was a contributor to the aforementioned Project for the New American Century.
‘The
Clean Break Document’ proposed that Israel give up on any objectives geared
towards achieving a comprehensive peace with the Arab world and that it should
instead work together with Turkey and Jordan to “contain, destabilize and
roll-back” those states which pose as threats to all three.
Just
as with the PNAC document, the strategy behind Israeli policy was to effect the
“weakening, controlling and even rolling back” of Syria.
The
threat posed to Israel by Syria thus has until recently been that of an
ostensibly united state in possession of a substantive mass of territory and relatively
large population under a strong form of leadership.
Israel
of course has over the decades successfully countered those threats posed by
Syria when Syria was part of coalitions of Arab armies as well as specific
confrontations in Lebanon such as when their air forces famously clashed in
duels over the Bekaa Valley in the early 1980s.
Israel
is a nation which from the time of its inception has operated with what has
been described as “strong survival instincts”. It has consistently penetrated the highest
levels of the command structures of Arab military and guerrilla organisations
including those of the Syrian state and groups to which Syria has given refuge
as well as those operating within its borders but which are hostile to the
government.
Indeed,
one of the most spectacularly successful feats of Israeli foreign intelligence was
the Mossad operation in which an Egyptian-born Jew of Syrian-Jewish parentage, Eli
Cohen, insinuated himself among the political and military elites of Syria by
posing as a wealthy Syrian-Argentine returnee.
Before
he was captured and hanged by the Syrian authorities, Cohen succeeded in
relaying vital pieces of information to his handlers which would be of
importance during the impending Six Day War of 1967.
The
penetration of terrorist groups is among the most difficult of endeavours in
the field of espionage, but Israel has consistently succeeded in this regard. In
1991, it was alleged that the United States, then embarked on a rapprochement
with the Syrian government, had unwittingly unmasked “two or three” Palestinian
agents working undercover for the Mossad in a Syrian-based guerrilla
organisation who were later executed.
There
is no reason to believe that these endeavours of espionage have not continued.
The current civil war has prompted much in the manner of overt and covert activity
along the Golan Heights border with Syria, the area which Israel seized after
the 1967 war and which it later annexed.
The
Israeli Defence Forces have mobilized troops and conducted a number of
manoeuvres along its Syrian border. It has launched missiles into Syria and
conducted bombing missions -all of which are illegal- which are believed to
have cost the lives of significant amounts of civilians.
Its
air force bombed a research centre in January of this year and a convoy of
weapons which they claimed were Iranian supplied and in transit to Hezbollah in
Lebanon was destroyed.
While
the media mulled over whether the Assad government would respond to the
research centre operation with a retaliatory attack on Israel as a means of
widening the war and possibly setting the scene for an Arab-Israeli war if
Israel embarked on an all-out attack on an Arab nation, one leader of the
Syrian opposition publically pledged not to attack Israel.
Israel
is central to the purported evidence that the American government is relying
upon as confirming the culpability of the Assad government in regard to the
chemical weapons attack which may lead to American strikes.
The
intercepted phone call apparently implicating members of the Syrian military
command structure emanated from Israeli military intelligence, the IDF’s 8200
Unit.
There
is every reason to treat such evidence with caution. For instance, the
formidable listening post operated by British intelligence on Mount Troodos in
Cyprus does not appear to have picked up any messages implicating the Assad
government in the chemical attack.
Such
intercepted evidence would have been made available to the British Joint
Intelligence Committee and would have been exploited by Prime Minister Cameron
in making his case to Parliament for military intervention.
It
is in Israel’s interest for the United States to attack Syria. Certainly, much
of the public discourse in its media has indicated that Israel would welcome
the fall of the Assad government.
Consider
for instance a report by Debka, an Israeli news outlet which related how senior
IDF officers criticised Moshe Ya’alon, the defence minister, for having
“misled” the Knesset about the amount of Syrian territory controlled by the
Assad government. “Erroneous assessments”, Debka stressed, “must lead to faulty
decision-making”.
Consider
also a Times of Israel editorial
piece by David Horovitz written in the immediate aftermath of the vote by the
British Parliament which ruled out involvement in an American-led attack on the
Assad military.
The
title, “Perfidious Albion hands murderous Assad a spectacular victory”, summed
up the writer’s feeling that what he described as “British ineptitude and
gutlessness” had “sent the wrong message to the butcher of Damascus, and left
Israel more certain than ever that it can only rely on itself.”
The
implication here is clear: Horovitz, whose paper had previously confirmed
Israeli intelligence as being the source of Syrian responsibility for the chemical
attack in Ghouta, is expectant of Western nations to remove the enemies of
Israel. But in the absence of the will to do this, Israel will have to resolve
to complete the task.
It
is an attitude that has manifested itself in the policies and pronouncements of
successive Israeli prime ministers. For instance, in 2003 as the Bush
administration primed itself to invade Iraq, Ariel Sharon called on the United
States to also disarm “Iran, Libya and Syria”.
More
recently, Benjamin Netanyahu issued persistent pleas to the United States to
launch attacks on Iran’s nuclear installations in order to remove the
“existential threat” that nation is claimed to pose to Israel.
It
is an attitude which fits into the outside-of-the-mainstream arguments that
Israel has through its influential lobbies in the Western world, got America
and its allies to ‘fight its wars’; wars which like the one in Iraq they allege
have reduced Arab nations into ‘failed states’ which have been effectively
balkanized.
When
earlier this year the veteran journalist Carl Bernstein referred to the
“insane” Iraq war as having been started by what he described as “Jewish
neo-cons who wanted to remake the world (for Israel)”, he was referring to the
proportionately high number of ethnic Jews who were part of the Project for the
New American Century and who subsequently held key positions in the Bush
administration which orchestrated an invasion that has ultimately led to the
division of that country into three distinct segments.
It
is the alleged power wielded by Israel lobbyists urging military intervention
in Syria which some have argued is behind the hardline stances of Western
leaders such as Britain’s David Cameron and France’s Francois Hollande.
Certainly,
the opinion pieces, articles and commentaries on the websites of organisations
such as AIPAC, the Anti-Defamation League and the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs are reflective of a position calling for American intervention in Syria
that goes further than mere gestures.
Even
if the Syrian government arguably deserves to meet its end, the means that have
been adopted by the United States and its allies to effect its removal cannot
be justified.
Although
led by a minority of the nation’s population and authoritarian in character,
the Baathist government, at the helm of which has been the ruling Assad dynasty,
has provided this fractious multi-ethnic country with a lengthy era of stability.
The period before the ascent of Hafez al Assad as the strongman-ruler was
marked by great turbulence as one military faction overthrew the other in a
game of political musical chairs.
Its
government represents the remnant of the socially progressive,
anti-imperialist, non-sectarian movements such as the pan-Arabism pioneered by
Egypt’s Gamal Abel Nasser and the Baathist philosophy espoused by Michel
Aflaq, a Syrian Christian.
The
nationalist character of the Syrian state and its secular nature provide the
basis for unity and inclusiveness in a society composed of Sunnis, Alawites,
Kurds, Orthodox Christians and Druze.
This
is arguably the most important reason as to why it has survived the onslaught
wrought by the Sunni-centred Free Syria Army and the Islamist militants who
conceive a chauvinist post-Assad future of a Sunni-dominated state or states
within which there would be an imposition of strict Sharia Law.
While
not as successful or as benevolent as the form of governance afforded by
Tunisia’s Habib Bourguiba, the Baath Party has provided most Syrians with a
standard of living and a measure of social freedom which compares favourably
with other parts of the Arab world.
But
it is fair to say that the economy has been mismanaged and that nepotism and
corruption are rife. The rule of Hafez al Assad, the President’s father is
correctly characterised as having been one which was conducted with iron-fisted
brutality.
The
savage clamp down on an insurrection by the Muslim Brotherhood in the city of
Hama in 1982 testified to the utter ruthlessness of a ruler who murdered
thousands of innocents in order to accomplish his objective.
The
image of strength however has not been one which the Assads have been able to
convey so far as reckoning with Israel is concerned. They have had to live with
the brutal reality of Israeli military might.
Hafez
Assad was the powerful minister of defence when Israel defeated three Arab
armies in the Six Day War during which the Golan Heights was overrun and he was
president when the Israelis annexed that territory.
While
Syria can claim that it alone of the three primary Arab combatant nations in
the wars with Israel has resisted reaching a settlement with Israel, it has not
been able to escape the charge of impotence in the face of numerous acts of
Israeli aggression towards it.
And
while it claims to have never sold out on the interests of the Palestinians,
such assertion neglects the fact that Assad senior never put his weight of
support behind the largest segment of the Palestinian liberation movement
which was led by Yassir Arafat.
Arafat
in fact became a sworn enemy of the elder Assad who attempted to have him
assassinated in order to install his own puppet Palestinian leader whom he
could manipulate in his dealings with his powerful Zionist neighbour.
In
fact, it was a secret kept for many years by a number of Arab figures that the
government of Syria of which Assad senior was an influential member negotiated
a secret agreement with Israel on the eve of the Six Day War which ensured that
the Syrian Army would do very little in the event of a war breaking out between
Israel and Egypt. This betrayal of their Arab allies and the Palestinian people
was a secret which those in the know did not mention for fear of fatal
retaliation.
The
history of the world up to the present day informs us that rivalries between
international alliances caused by different political, social and economic
systems can best be contained by an overarching system of international
security which can achieve a measure of stability in the relations between
nations, if not quite creating an idealised state of harmonious co-existence.
The
problem with the policies of the United States and its allies who have fomented
and facilitated the troubles in Syria is a failure to recognise that
differences can be best contained by adopting strategies which are predicated
on respecting national sovereignty and adopting purposeful and genuine policies
which are geared towards constructive dialogue.
The
tripartite alliance that comprises the Shiite Crescent is one which has
interests that ought to be respected. The idea of destroying Syria and then
Iran whether emanating from notions of the American Empire, Zionist
Revisionism, Saudi Wahhabism or the Ottoman school of thought, is one that is
rooted in an arrogant mentality; being based on inflexible assumptions which
find their raison detre in the aspiration to control and dominate others.
In
many respects, Syria’s ‘crime’ as with the case of Iran and before the change
of regime, that of the Gaddafi-era Libya, was a failure to strictly toe the
line so far as being obeisant to Western interests is concerned.
The
fall of Gaddafi, whose state owed no debts to the international banking system,
has paved the way for the intervention of international financial agencies
given that NATO’s ‘humanitarian’ action managed
to destroy Libya’s infrastructure and will grant Western governments access to
the water resources created by Gaddafi’s Great Man River project.
Similarly,
the fall of the Assad dynasty would pave the way for the building of an oil
pipeline from Saudi Arabia to Turkey and would remove a vital supply conduit to
Hezbollah whose doctrinal and organisational discipline, reminiscent of the
early Zionists in Palestine, has provided something of a check on the actions
of Israel.
The
moralistic stances often taken by America in its history have frequently been
compromised by a sanctimonious tone which consistently asserts that its actions
are predicated on sound values rather than on naked self-interest.
Thus,
the intention to launch punitive strikes against Syria for the unproven use of
chemical weapons is not based on a profound abhorrence for the act or to genuinely
effect a deterrent, but is in fact geared towards giving advantage to the foes
of Bashar Assad.
That
Assad’s foes are Islamic fanatics of the sort against who America claims to be
waging a so-called War on Terror is not accidental but is, as previously
explained, a consciously adopted policy.
The
mercenaries who have been armed and financed at the behest of America in a sense
gives confirmation to what ostensibly appears to be a grotesque analysis: that
al Qaeda has served as America’s ‘foreign legion’ since the time when it
financed the Mujahedeen in its ‘holy war’ in Afghanistan against the invading
Soviet armies.
They
have been used in Lebanon in operations against Hezbollah, they were utilised
to overthrow Libya’s Colonel Gaddafi and are presently being used in an attempt
to effect regime change in Syria.
Another
point of deep irony is the resolve of the United States to intervene over a comparably small proportion of deaths when given the overall tally
of lives which have been consumed by an array of devastatingly powerful weapons
and intricate but lethal forms of munitions: The agony of death, the finality
of physical destruction and the legacy of tragedy are all consistent features
regardless of the means by which they are realised.
It
is a war which would almost certainly have never reached its current level of
intensity and depravity without the active connivance of the United States.
That
the expected campaign of strikes on Syria, ostensibly based on humanitarian
precepts will end up killing and maiming even more people is, perhaps, the
deepest irony of all.
(C)
Adeyinka Makinde (2013)
Adeyinka
Makinde is a writer and law lecturer based in England.
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