General Waldemar
Skrzypczak (rtd)
In a recent interview in the Polish media, retired General Waldemar
Skrzypczak spoke of the possibility of NATO launching a pre-emptive nuclear
strike against the Russian Federation. His remarks not only serve to remind of
the danger of a thermonuclear war between the world’s nuclear powers in the new
era ‘Cold War’ -an issue which is disturbingly underplayed in the public
discourse on global security- they should also serve to concentrate the minds of
the Polish people on the question of the survival of their nation in the event
of a nuclear armageddon.
Wlademar
Skrzypczak’s comments recorded by the media conglomerate Wirtualna
Polska speak of the hardline, anti-Russian attitude
of many influential establishment figures in former Eastern Bloc nations who
have welcomed NATO’s eastward expansion towards Russia’s borders, as well as
the deployment of innovative weaponry such as missile shields.
But the idea
of a nuclear ‘First Strike’ has perilous implications for Poland.
It was always
understood at the time of the U.S.-Soviet Cold War that Poland would be wiped
off the map in the event of a nuclear war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The
same can be argued today if a war of similar magnitude developed between NATO
and the Russian Federation.
Skrzypczak’s
thinking is reminiscent of the dangerous expositions of Herman Kahn who
believed in a “First Strike” doctrine and a winnable nuclear war. Yet, if he is
truly serious about this, he may have to bear in mind the ‘Demographic
Precaution Plan’ suggested by Tadeusz Tuczapski, a senior Polish general during
the Cold War. The plan provided that Poland could only be preserved by building
a special bunker housing a hundred men and two hundred women who would form the
germ of a reconstituted Polish nation after a nuclear holocaust.
Tuczapski,
who like many of his counterparts was alarmed at the prospect of Poland having
to bear the brunt of a nuclear attack, outlined his theory to Polish leader
General Wojciech Jaruzelski at a training briefing in the General Staff:
I stood up
and told Jaruzelski, “General, more should be given to Civil Defence so that a
good, solid bunker could be built, lock up in that bunker a hundred Polish men,
some sort of real good fuckers and two hundred women so that we can rebuild the
Polish nation. Give some money for that.”
Jaruzelski
was apparently offended either by what he perceived as Tuczapski’s flipancy or
the tastefulness of his remarks. Perhaps both. But Tuczapski felt that he was
being a realist. Many senior Polish generals were worried that Poland would not
survive even a limited exchange of nuclear weapons in a conflict which was
often envisaged would start off with conventional battles that were certain to
inflict great damage on Poland’s civil and military infrastructure.
Whatever the
shortcomings may be of her internal administration, the narrative of Russian
aggression does not stand up to objective scrutiny. Indeed, what may be termed
as ‘aggression’ has come from the West: NATO’s eastward expansion in breach of
agreements reached between the leaders of America and the Soviet Union as a
condition of the reunification of Germany, the abrogation by the United States of
the Intermediate Nuclear Forces regime, and the deployment of a missile shield
system.
Conflicts
involving the Russian armed forces near and at a distance from its borders can
be persuasively argued to have been reactive rather than proactive in nature:
the response to Georgia’s aggression against South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the
absorption of Crimea in response to the U.S.-backed coup in Kiev which
threatened Russia’s security interests in the Black Sea, and the NATO-supported
infiltration into Syria by Islamist militias which mirrored covert US support
for Chechen Jihadists.
Remarks of
the sort made by Skrzypczak were rare during the U.S.-Soviet Cold War because
leaders on both sides were careful to seek to diffuse tensions and not
intensify them. It is time for the leaders of Poland, the Baltic nations and
others to begin speaking in terms of dialogue and diplomacy; not war. Otherwise
the Polish nation must begin seriously considering the Tuczapsk Demographic
Plan.
© Adeyinka
Makinde (2019)
Adeyinka
Makinde is a writer based in London, England.
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