The subtext
behind this appraisal posits the Russian Federation as headed by a former KGB
‘thug’ named Vladimir Putin; a man not so much as imbued with dictatorial
tendencies (since that would pre-suppose that he had at least some redeeming
democratic tendencies), but one who is comfortably and unabashedly
authoritarian in nature; who sits atop a kleptocracy, where the operation of the
rule of law is but a figment of the imagination of Russia’s present written
constitution.
The threats
supposedly posed to Ukraine by an aggressive Russian state is to many Western
–and Eastern- European eyes redolent of the tactics utilised by the Soviet
Union which was willing to trample under foot any dissenting nation wishing to
jettison itself out of the orbit of its larger, more powerful neighbour. It was
Hungary and Czechoslovakia during the Soviet-era and it is Georgia and Ukraine
in the post-Communist era.
The big,
bold, bad bear of the east it would seem carries the same mark of the communist
beast. It may have changed the colour of its fur but underneath it all it
remains the same; something his critics are often quick to remind was confirmed
by Putin himself when quoting him in 2005 as having said that the fall of the
Soviet Union was “the greatest geo-political catastrophe of the century”.
That
unflattering condensed portrait may be considered to be a faithful rendition of
the orthodox view of Russia today.
But is it the
whole truth? The Western eye has for long gazed eastward simultaneously
perplexed and horrified by the foreign policy inclinations of the Russian
state. In 1939, Winston Churchill characterised it as a “riddle wrapped in a
mystery inside an enigma”.
Yet, whether
Churchill’s words were referring solely to the thinking behind the communist
regime alone or, on the other hand, to an overarching, historically
continuously unpredictable system of thought patterns held by successive
Russian leaders, they spoke more from an instinctive standpoint rather than any
form of enlightened and empirical examination.
To understand
the present crisis in Ukraine just as should be the case in understanding any
crisis of this sort, one must place it within its proper context: the
historical, geo-political and economic forces which have collided to create the
situation.
Thus, it is
important to understand at least a distilled history of what makes Russia
different from the West even after the fall of communism and the importance to
Russia of Ukraine with which it shares a common border as well as a common
heritage.
It is also of
crucial importance to understand the long-term foreign policy objectives which
the United States, at the helm of a military empire named NATO, is pursuing in
relation to Russia, and, as far as can be discerned, the role of the United
States and the European Union in colluding to precipitate the crisis that has
ensued.
The meaning
of Ukraine, literally ‘the land on the edge’, while suggestive of a patronising
attitude and hegemonic policy is also informative of the Russian psyche of
insecurity. Understanding Russian sensitivities about its security and the
historical difficulties it has found in protecting itself against external
aggression through its vast and open borderlands is of the utmost importance.
This also
gives an idea about why the style of Russian governance has tended towards
autocracy. Despite a post-communist constitution providing for a clear separation
of the powers of state and guarantees of personal freedoms, Russia, while no
longer subject to the totalitarianism of the Soviet era, is clearly far from
operating along the lines of a liberal democracy.
But the
claims by Ukrainian separatists that they are somewhat naturally inclined to
practice Western notions of a representative democracy while the Russians are
inherently receptive only of governance bearing the trappings of autocracy is a
slanted and ethnicized perspective that is wide of the mark.
It is true
that the civilization of Kievan Rus bore vestiges of consultative government
which in the course of time could have metamorphosed into a fully-fledged
democratic tradition, but it was a loose confederation of princely states
including that of Novgorod – a state readily identified even by non-Russians
with modern Russia- and cannot be claimed solely as the inheritance of modern
day Ukrainians as it is also the inheritance of the Russian people.
An
appreciation that Kievan Rus, part of which was situated in modern Ukraine, is
the cradle of Russian civilization is thus critical in understanding the strong
attitude held by Russians towards Ukraine.
The reason
why Russia has a leader such as Vladimir Putin can also be explained by an
examination of the past.
There have
been several key moments in Russia’s history when it could have turned away
from autocracy and leant towards notions of the law governed state of the sort
which aspects of the governance of Kievan Rus promised.
But the
Mongol invasion and crucial events such as the ‘Years of Trouble’ which
followed the death of Ivan The Terrible, the assassination of Tsar Alexander
II, the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks and the chaos during the presidency
of Boris Yeltsin all played out in such a way that the need for
‘strong’governance came up trumps.
It is the
fear of descending into chaos which has prompted acquiescence to ‘strong
government’, in Russian parlance expressed as Zhelesyana Ruka (Silnaya Ruka)
which roughly translates as ‘rule by the iron fist’.
Such
mentality is at the heart of the formation of Russia given that the chronicles
state that the feuding eastern Slavic tribes invited Rurik, a Viking king to
rule over them so that order and not chaos be allowed to prevail.
It has even
been argued that the legacy bequeathed to Russia by Mongol invasion and
governance; that of autocratic rulership, is somewhat analogous to the
‘Stockholm Syndrome’.
If an
increasing number of Russians are privately tired of Putin being at the helm of
the affairs of state, most are still thankful for the decisive role that he
played in bringing order to the chaotic state of affairs which resulted during
the post-Soviet era when Boris Yeltsin occupied the presidency.
It was during
Yeltsin’s time in office that assets of the Soviet state were sold off at
knockdown prices and acquired by those who became known as the
‘Oligarchs’.These men perpetuated their wealth through fraud, bribery and
murder.
They enriched
themselves while the vast majority of ordinary Russians, totally bereft of a
protective state apparatus, desperately improvised the means of ensuring their
survival. In the chaotic transformation from the controlling Soviet state to an
unregulated free-for-all, cowboy state of laissez
faire economics, many literally starved to death.
It was
Vladimir Putin, the anointed successor of Yeltsin, who put a stop to this state
of affairs. The rape of Russia’s economy and the plundering of its assets, a
great deal of which were secreted outside the country was brought to an end.
The economy was stabilised.
Putin then
took on the Oligarchs. His message was blunt, “You can keep your ill-gotten
wealth, but do not interfere with the political direction of the country.”
Those who did not heed this warning like Vladimir Guzinsky and Boris
Brerezovsky were forced to flee the country, while others such as Mikhail
Khodorkovsky at one time reputed to be the richest man in Russia and the head
of the Yukos Energy Corporation was stripped of his wealth and Yukos
nationalised.
While the
West viewed his actions against Khodorkovsky as having been in contravention of
the norms of due legal procedure, many Russians applauded Putin’s actions as
those of a patriot who was standing up for Russia’s interests.
With
Khodorkovsky at the helm of a body controlling a vast amount of Russia’s
natural resources parts of which potentially, perhaps even inevitably would be
sold to Western commercial interests, Putin was not going to countenance the
control of these resources effectively falling into the hands of foreign
interests.
The need to
protect Russia from external efforts geared towards its destabilisation and
potential domination by the West is based on fears which are not ill-founded.
There is
evidence that the thrust of American policy towards Russia is based on a desire
on the part of the United States to effect the destabilisation of the Russian
Federation as a continuum of objectives conceived at the time of the breakup of
the Soviet Union.
A plan
formulated by the influential political scientist Zbigniew Brzezinski involved
a strategy aimed at containing and then destroying the military capability of
what remained of the Soviet Union. The idea would be that Russia would be
reduced to a peripheral status which would be used to service the energy needs
of the West.
There had
been an agreement between James Baker, the US secretary of state of the day and
Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet leader that in return for allowing East Germany to
re-unite with West Germany, NATO would not extend its reach into Eastern
Europe. This agreement was of course not adhered to.
Russia has
seen NATO and the European Union expand their spheres of influence by co-opting
most of the Eastern European states which were members of the Warsaw Pact and
is naturally wary of having NATO bases right on its perimeter.
That the
conflict between Georgia and Russia was set up by the West to test the resolve
of Russia is now beyond any doubt. Mikheil Saakashvili, the irascible Georgian
leader prompted an incident which led to a short, sharp and brutal beat down by
the Russian military.
The incursion
into Georgia and the threatened incursion into Ukraine, while seeming to be
aggressive manoeuvres by Russia are arguably defensive measures. The fears that
the Bolshevik regime had about Western capitalist encirclement is replicated
contemporarily by the actions of the United States which Russia views as
aggressively pursuing a similar policy.
America’s
deployment of nuclear defensive shields in locations such as Poland, Bulgaria
and Turkey which the United States reassures Russia is aimed at defending
against Iran’s non-existent nuclear capability, as well as from rogue missiles
launched from North Korea, must be taken into account when judging Russia’s
actions. Such assurances are clearly disingenuous as the reality of their being
deployed against Russia would be apparent to any neutral bystander.
Indeed,
putting American sincerity to the test, the Russians offered to share the
burden of placing radar technology in Azerbaijan on the Russian border with
Iran, but this offer was met by a resounding silence from Washington.
The
implications of such a policy are clear: That the United States seeks to create
an advantage in the ultimate scenario; namely that in a war with Russia, it
will have the capability of mounting a first strike at a nuclear armed rival
with the assurance that it will be protected from retaliatory strikes.
It is
arguably a dangerous policy which on examination presents the United States in
the mould of the aggressor rather than a party on the defensive. The danger
here is that as the United States nears a the situation where Russia becomes
locked in by the Ballistic Defence Shield programme, the Russians will be
tempted to use a pre-emptive strike option if and when it is drawn into a grave
crisis with the United States.
Lacking a
significant access to sea routes on all points of the compass, the crisis in
Ukraine affects Russia’s vital interests to the extent that any threat that it
could be severed from the only route that it has to the Mediterranean ocean is
one which cannot be countenanced.
Russia
believes that it is being targeted because it is the only country other than
China which is capable of defying the United States and which in fact has
frustrated American goals on a number of occasions.
Russia stood
by while the United States and NATO waged an illegal war of aggression against
Iraq and looked on wearily as it invaded a country near its borders:
Afghanistan.
The Russians
were clearly duped by the United States into supporting the United Nations
resolution which led to NATO’s war in Libya, ostensibly conducted to protect
innocent civilians from being slaughtered but in actuality a pre-designed plan
geared to effect the overthrow of Colonel Muamer Gaddafi.
Putin’s
sleight of hand in diffusing imminent American military action against the
forces of the government of President Bashar Assad in Syria was an excellent
demonstration of statecraft which frustrated the objective of giving advantage
on the field of battle to the so-called Free Syrian Army action and other
avowed Islamist insurgents and not the publically stated aim of protecting
innocent civilians or of punishing the regime for unleashing chemical weapons,
which were blamed on the Assad government, but of which no tangible evidence of
the Syrian government’s culpability has been presented.
The Russians
were not going to be fooled again.
As with the
case of Georgia, there is ample evidence available which makes it clear that
the crisis in the Ukraine was a manufactured event bearing the hallmarks of
manipulation by the United States.
What
effectively can be considered to have been a coup d’état against an elected
leader was executed against President Viktor Yanukovych between February the 21stand
the 23rd.
It was a
culmination of a prolonged period of agitation referred to as the ‘Euro
Maiden’protests which despite the impressions given by the Western media was
not a widely supported movement and in fact was spearheaded by a hardcore of
far Right radicals including members of a neo-Nazi militia named Pravy Sektor
(‘Right Sector’) who with the connivance of the main opposition parties were
tasked with protecting a rent-a-crowd brigade drawn from the ranks of Ukraine’s
unemployed who were bussed in from areas around the country.
When events
took a more violent turn, Pravy Sektor members armed with guns, laser weapons
and Molotov cocktails were at the heart of it. This was a deliberate escalation
designed to portray disorder and a sense that things were out of control to
discredit the Yanukovych government.
Most
Ukrainians, whatever their ethnicity and apathetic about the state of affairs
of their country, simply were not a part of the protests.
Yanukovych,
whose election was considered legitimate according to independent election
monitors, was removed by means which did not follow the procedure for
presidential impeachment as laid down in the Ukrainian constitution.
It was a coup
which was apparently encouraged by the United States government; evidence of
which surfaced through the dissemination of intercepted wiretaps of an early
February conversation between Victoria Nuland and the United States ambassador
to Ukraine.
The footage
catches Nuland in her inelegant brand of English decrying the caution of the
European Union in their attitude to the Ukrainian issue. It is apparent that
she felt that that institution was not being forceful enough in persuading the
Yanukovych government to bow to Western pressure to move away from Russian
influence.
But Nuland
was not only raging about the EU’s lack of aggression. She can be heard to be
actually handpicking the people who would become members of the so-called
‘interim government’ installed after the overthrow of the Yanokovych
government.
The sight of
United States government figures such as Nuland and Senator John McCain
meeting with opposition figures and giving succour and encouragement to
anti-government protesters bear witness to its blatant interference in the
affairs of a sovereign nation.
McCain
himself is a representative of the International Republican Institute, a body
created under the auspices of the National Endowment for Democracy during
William Colby’s tenure as head of the Central Intelligence Agency which has a
remit to do what the CIA did, namely that of instigating regime change, only
through private means.
The IRI may
be one source through which the funding of foreign groups opposed to
governments not to the liking of the United States can be channelled. And if
not providing funding, since there are Ukrainian opposition figures with huge
amounts of wealth available to perform such task, it can provide the necessary
directions in terms of strategy.
The United
States certainly has a history of financing destabilisation in Ukraine. NGOs
such as Freedom House and the National Endowment for Democracy utilized funds
emanating from the government and channelled them around the country in order
to foment what came to be known as the ‘Orange Revolution’ in 2004.
Another
disclosure adding great weight to the belief that the series of events leading
to the removal of Yanukovych were planned and executed by covert actions is
that of the intercepted telephone conversation between Urmas Paet, the Estonian
foreign minister who had recently been in Kiev, and Catherine Ashton, the EU’s
foreign minister.
In it, Paet
informs Ashton that the sniper killings in the square which had been the focus
of the protests had been carried out by “someone in the new coalition”. The snipers
were shooting at both police and protesters. This is the classic modus operandi
of a secret third force mounting a ‘false flag’ operation and seeking to
discredit an opponent by laying the blame on them.
Keen on
putting up appearances before the foreign news media, Yanukovych had actually
restrained himself from taking a hard-line against the protesters by sending
the police out to confront the protesters unarmed, a fact to which he alluded
during this last press conference.
However,
events eventually overwhelmed Yanukovych who lost his nerve and fled. He was
presumably threatened and reached the conclusion that his safety could not be
guaranteed if he continued in office.
The fear
which presumably overcame Yanukovych becomes appreciable when considering the
sort of people now ascended to the interim governance of Ukraine. And it is all
the more disturbing that the United States and the European Union have failed
to publically register their protests, or at a minimum, to express concerns
about the appointment of those whose political stripes bear the unmistakable
marks of the extreme political Right.
While Russia
has placed a great deal of focus on the presence of xenophobic and anti-Semitic
neo-Nazis among the appointees to the new government, the United States appears
to be downplaying these concerns.
For instance,
the new minister of defence belongs to Svobada, meaning ‘Freedom Party’, whose
members are the spiritual disciples and worshippers of Stephan Bandera, the
World War Two-era Ukrainian fascist leader who headed the Galician Division of
the Waffen SS. The leader of Svoboda has in the past talked about liberating
Ukraine from what he described as the “Muscovite-Jewish mafia.”
Yet, Victoria
Nuland, herself Jewish, happily consents to pose with the leader of this party.
And Senator McCain who shamelessly posed with members of the imported,
mercenary death squads in Syria does the same with Svoboda Party members.
The present
state of affairs has an element of the surreal about it. It all seems rather
strange when, as reported by the Jewish Telegraphic Agency, Israeli Army
veterans instructed by Svoboda activists are leading street-fighting units in
clashes with law enforcement bodies during the agitations which led to the
overthrow of an elected government.
The members
of Pravy Sektor and Spilna Sprava which Israeli news outlets have described as
“Fascist” and “neo-Nazi” have met with the Israeli ambassador to Ukraine to
give assurances that they are “no longer anti-Semitic”.
The United
States, of course, has a history of dallying with extremist groups in order to
combat those who stand in opposition to its objectives. It utilised neo-Fascist
groups in Western Europe via its Gladio operations to neutralise the influence
of the political Left during the Cold War-era and more recently, has given
support to Islamist groups in the Lebanon, Libya and Syria in order to pursue
overarching foreign policy objectives.
The presence
of neo-Nazi elements who are also Russophobes naturally strikes a chord of
concern among the ethnic Russian population. One of the first decisions of the
newly installed government was to ban the use of Russian in parts of the
country. Ethnic Russians are unlikely to have their confidence reposed in the
minister for food and the anti-corruption minister who are Ukrainian
ultra-nationalists.
The Russian
decision to intervene in order to protect the ethnic Russian population, while
difficult to justify under the strict tenets of international law, does have
more than a veneer of justness about it given the illegal removal of a head of
state and because of the genuine fears held by a section of the population.
The
intervention in foreign nations under the ‘Right to Protect’ doctrine is
admittedly a policy utilised by Adolf Hitler regarding ethnic German
populations in the Sudetenland and Danzig. However, it was revived in recent
times as a legitimate basis for the sanctioning of foreign intervention by the
United States.
The coup
against President Yanukovych was a concoction encouraged, and from the
chronology of available evidence, engineered by the United States and the
European Union. The deadline given by the EU to Yanukovych concerning the offer
of a bailout was designed to precipitate the unrest that transpired.
It was not a
popular wave of unrest which caught on to 45 million Ukrainians who are
concerned about the levels of corruption across the political class of their
nation. This has contributed to the economic malaise which may be set for an
even worse turning due to Western efforts in removing an elected government and
installing an unelected one.
Russia is
unlikely to step in to bail out Ukraine given the recent course of events. The
economic deal that Ukraine has with Russia is a largely fair one which takes
Ukrainian interests into account including a subsidy in the cost of gas.
The
International Monetary Fund on the other hand can only offer Ukrainians a dose
of painful austerity measures: the removal of gas subsidies, a cut in pensions
and a devaluation of the national currency.
The EU would
also be unlikely to provide a panacea for Ukraine’s financial ills. With
bailouts given to Greece and Portugal and with the economies of Italy, Spain
and the Netherlands looking distinctly shaky, support from member nations of a
substantial package to Ukraine would be lacking.
The United
States, itself under strict self-imposed budgetary constraints, is unlikely to
come to the rescue given the difficulty of justifying such aid in a situation
that is largely of its making.
The wider,
long-term solution to this geo-political quagmire surely lies in steering a
course which sees Ukraine develop along the lines of Finland during the Cold
War-era. The Fins supported Nazi Germany when Hitler launched Operation Barbarossa
against the Soviet Union which led to Finland acquiring Russian land.
The deal
reached after the war’s end, and one which endured and from which both nations
profited, was that in return for Soviet respect for Finnish sovereignty, they
were to remain neutral: not to join NATO or the Common Market and to renounce
claims on Russian territory which in effect led to an effective marginalising
of Finnish ultra-nationalist groups.
In the same
way, Ukraine should give up hopes of NATO and EU membership and marginalise
those far Right and ultra-nationalist groups which are being given a say in the
running of its government.
At the same
time, the United States should cease its efforts geared towards destabilising
Russia’s borderlands. The sanctioning of the coup in Ukraine in which
ultra-nationalists and neo-Nazis are given significant access to power has
nothing to do with the urge to spread freedom and democracy and everything to
do with an overarching policy of diminishing Russian power and influence.
There also
needs to be an open public debate in the United States regarding the spread of
the ballistic defence shield program which would enlighten the American public
about the offensive capacity that it poses to a potential Russian foe and
hence, the inherently mistrustful atmosphere that pursuing this provocative
policy will continue to breed.
There are a
number of geo-political situations which conceivably could lead to a World War
Three situation, and the United States long-term policy toward Russia is one of
them.
(C) Adeyinka
Makinde (2014)
Adeyinka
Makinde is a London-based writer.
