Original cover of Ian
Fleming's “The Man with the Golden Gun” which was published by Jonathan Cape on
April 1st 1965, 55 years ago this month. Art: Richard Chopping (1917-2008).
It has become
an annual delight to discover the production of yet another of the James Bond
novels by the BBC Radio Drama department. To be more accurate, the stories of
Ian Fleming’s foreign intelligence agent are produced by the husband and wife
team of Martin Jarvis and Rosalind Ayres for the BBC.
This
adaptation, again by Archie Scottney, is The
Man With The Golden Gun. This Fleming work was published after his death
and received rather lukewarm reviews. It is the novel which followed You Only Live Twice, where Bond avenged
the death of his wife Tracy by killing his arch-enemy Ernst Stavro Blofeld in
Japan.
But Bond was
injured while escaping from the wrecking of Blofeld’s castle. And as he did not
report back after his mission, the government declared him to be ‘Missing in
Action’; presumed dead. His obituary
was in fact published in the London Times.
Bond had in fact survived but became afflicted by amnesia, a condition that persisted
after he regained his physical health while living as a Japanese fisherman. You Only Live Twice ended with a glimmer
of memory recovered: Bond’s coming across the city of Vladivostok in a
newspaper triggers a yearning to go to Russia, a country with which he thinks
his forgotten life history was intimately involved.
The Man With The Golden Gun takes up the
story. Bond is eventually discovered and apprehended by the Soviet Secret
Service which brainwashes him and programmed him to assassinate his boss, M, who
in the novel has his identity revealed for the first time as Admiral Sir Miles
Messervy.
Once the plot
is foiled, Bond is rehabilitated and rather than face criminal charges of
treason and attempted murder is, to use the words of M, “thrown back” at the
Soviets by assigning him the task of neutralising Francisco Scaramanga, a fast
drawing gunman who is a contract killer for his Soviet masters, and who is
embarked on a nefarious enterprise involving the pro-Soviet regime of Fidel
Castro which is trying to muscle out its Caribbean competitors in the sugar
cane market.
As your readers will have learned from
earlier issues, a senior officer of the Ministry of Defence, Commander James
Bond, C.M.G., R.N.V.R., is missing, believed killed, while on an official
mission to Japan. It grieves me to have to report that hopes of his survival
must now be abandoned. It therefore falls to my lot, as the Head of the
Department he served so well, to give some account of this officer and of his
outstanding services to his country.
James Bond was born of a Scottish father,
Andrew Bond of Glencoe, and a Swiss mother, Monique Delacroix, from the Canton
de Vaud. His father being a foreign representative of the Vickers armaments
firm, his early education, from which he inherited a first-class command of
French and German, was entirely abroad. When he was eleven years of age, both
his parents were killed in a climbing accident in the Aiguilles Rouges above
Chamonix, and the youth came under the guardianship of an aunt, since deceased,
Miss Charmian Bond, and went to live with her at the quaintly-named hamlet of
Pett Bottom near Canterbury in Kent. There, in a small cottage hard by the
attractive Duck Inn, his aunt, who must have been a most erudite and
accomplished lady, completed his education for an English public school, and,
at the age of twelve or thereabouts, he passed satisfactorily into Eton, for
which College he had been entered at his birth by his father. It must be
admitted that his career at Eton was brief and undistinguished and, after only
two halves, as a result, it pains me to record, of some alleged trouble with
one of the boys' maids, his aunt was requested to remove him. She managed to
obtain his transfer to Fettes, his father's old school. Here the atmosphere was
somewhat Calvinistic, and both academic and athletic standards were rigorous.
Nevertheless, though inclined to be solitary by nature, he established some
firm friendships among the traditionally famous athletic circles at the school.
By the time he left, at the early age of
seventeen, he had twice fought for the school as a light-weight and had, in
addition, founded the first serious judo class at a British public school. By
now it was 1941 and, by claiming an age of nineteen and with the help of an old
Vickers colleague of his father, he entered a branch of what was subsequently
to become the Ministry of Defence. To serve the confidential nature of his
duties, he was accorded the rank of lieutenant in the Special Branch of the
R.N.V.R., and it is a measure of the satisfaction his services gave to his
superiors that he ended the war with the rank of Commander. It was about this
time that the writer became associated with certain aspects of the Ministry's
work, and it was with much gratification that I accepted Commander Bond's
post-war application to continue working for the Ministry in which, at the time
of his lamented disappearance, he had risen to the rank of Principal Officer in
the Civil Service.
The nature of Commander Bond's duties
with the Ministry, which were, incidentally, recognized by the appointment of
C.M.G. in 1954, must remain confidential, nay secret, but his colleagues at the
Ministry will allow that he performed them with outstanding bravery and
distinction, although occasionally, through an impetuous strain in his nature,
with a streak of the foolhardy that brought him in conflict with higher
authority. But he possessed what almost amounted to "The Nelson
Touch" in moments of the highest emergency, and he somehow contrived to
escape more or less unscathed from the many adventurous paths down which his
duties led him. The inevitable publicity, particularly in the foreign press,
accorded some of these adventures, made him, much against his will, something
of a public figure, with the inevitable result that a series of popular books
came to be written around him by a personal friend and former colleague of
James Bond. If the quality of these books, or their degree of veracity, had
been any higher, the author would certainly have been prosecuted under the
Official Secrets Act. It is a measure of the disdain in which these fictions
are held at the Ministry, that action has not yet -- I emphasize the
qualification -- been taken against the author and publisher of these high-flown
and romanticized caricatures of episodes in the career of a outstanding public
servant.
It only remains to conclude this brief in
memoriam by assuring his friends that Commander Bond's last mission was one of
supreme importance to the State. Although it now appears that, alas, he will
not return from it, I have the authority of the highest quarters in the land to
confirm that the mission proved to be one hundred per cent successful. It is no
exaggeration to pronounce unequivocally that, through the recent valorous
efforts of this one man, the Safety of the Realm has received mighty
reassurance.
James Bond was briefly married in 1962,
to Teresa, only daughter of Marc-Ange Draco, of Marseilles. The marriage ended
in tragic circumstances that were reported in the press at the time. There was
no issue of the marriage and James Bond leaves, so far as I am aware, no
relative living.
M.G. writes:
I was happy and proud to serve Commander
Bond in a close capacity during the past three years at the Ministry of Defence.
If our fears for him are justified, may I suggest these simple words for his
epitaph? Many of the junior staff here feel they represent his philosophy:
"I shall not waste my days in trying
to prolong them. I shall use my time."
- From the novel You Only Live Twice by Ian Fleming. Published by Jonathan Cape:
London (1964).
Nigerian
Regimental Drummer in 1910. Credit: C.P.P. Lawson
This
is a fascinating watercolour painting of a drummer of the early colonial army
set up by the British as they consolidated their power and control over lands
in what would become the Northern and Southern Protectorates of Nigeria.
After
the destruction in 1897 of the Kingdom of Benin, the British sought to create a
military forces that would not only complete the pacification of the remaining
independent kingdoms and acephalous groups around the area, but also to guard
areas within British spheres of influence from those controlled by the French. Although
a multi-ethnic force, the Nigerian force was largely composed of Hausas from
Northern Nigeria, and the Hausa language became the army’s lingua franca.
The
body which was created in 1900 was the West African Frontier Force (WAFF). The
objective was for the WAFF to garrison the English-speaking lands of Nigeria,
Gold Coast and Sierra Leone. The force received royal recognition in 1928, when
it became known as the Royal West African Frontier Force (RWAFF).
The
regiments created by the WAFF and the succeeding RWAFF would form the basis of
the armies of the colonies after they attained independence.
Lt.-General Joe Ankrah of Ghana (Host) Lt.-Colonel Yakubu Gowon, Chief
of Army Staff of Nigeria (announced as 'Supreme Commander' while whereabouts of
Ironsi was 'unknown'); Lt.-Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu, Military Governor of
Eastern Nigeria; Colonel Robert Adeyinka Adebayo, Military Governor of Western
Nigeria; Lt.-Colonel Hassan Katsina, Military Governor of Northern Nigeria; Lt.-Colonel
David Ejoor, Military Governor of Mid-Western Nigeria; Major Mobolaji Johnson,
Military Governor of Lagos; Alhaji Kam Selem, Deputy Inspector-General of
Police; Mr. T. Omo-Bare; Commodore Akinwale Wey, Chief of Naval Staff.
The Main Topic: Re-Organizing Nigeria Attitudes at Aburi.
a. How the military looks at the politicians.
General Ankrah
(Ghana): I will not like to dwell rigidly on any point whatsoever because I feel
this is a domestic affair of Nigeria and, as I have always said, it is not
difficult for military people to understand each other. It is a saying that if
Generals were to meet and discuss frontiers, wars or even go into the details
to forestall war, there will never be any differences or discrepancies but
unity and understanding. There will be no war because the two old boys will
meet at the frontier and tell each other: 'Old boy, we are not going to commit
our boys to die, come on, let us keep the politicians out' and that is the end.
I am quite confident that having met here to-day, you will continue and achieve
what you are here for. What I want to stress is this, that through the annals
of history we have not seen failures with military statesmen and when military
personnel do take over the reins of Government they have proved their worth
and, I am sure and confident that the Military regimes that have been saddled
with the onerous responsibility of rebuilding and reconstructing the various
countries in Africa will not let us down. You are aware that in Nigeria now the
whole world is looking up to you as military men and if there is any failure to
reunify or even bring perfect understanding to Nigeria as a whole, you will
find that the blame will rest with us all through the centuries. There is no
gainsaying this whatsoever. Whatever the situation we are soldiers and soldiers
are always statesmen not politicians. They deal with a little bit of politics
and diplomacy when the time comes but they are statesmen. The people first and
they themselves second but if you think like the politicians do that they want
fame or they want to be heard of and neglect your people then, of course, I am
quite sure that we as soldiers will live to regret, even our future generations
will live to regret. They will be blaming us whenever our names are called or
mentioned....
Major Johnson: Gentlemen, if I
can start talking on this one, please do not think I am taking undue advantage.
Quite honestly I think we all know what brought this country to where we are
to-day and while talking yesterday Emeka [first name of Lt.-Col. Ojukwu]
touched on a point of how, due to the situation, the politicians got what they
have been waiting for to come in. While I very much welcome this Item 4 and
while I know that definitely we are not going to be in Government forever, I
will like to say that, please for the next six months let us leave everything
that will bring the politicians back into the limelight out of the question.
Let us go on all these things we have been discussing since yesterday because
this is on the basis at which we can get our country back on its feet. Once we
can get the papers on these things out and we see them working then we can call
the Ad Hoc Constitutional Committee to come and discuss but for now they are
just going to confuse the issues more if you bring them out to come and talk
anything again. I will say let the Military Government continue for now and
after working for six months and we see how far we can go before we start
thinking of calling these people back.
Commodore Wey: I 100% support
what you have said. Candidly if there had ever been a time in my life when I
thought somebody had hurt me sufficiently for me to wish to kill him it was
when one of these fellows opened his mouth too wide. I think we should let them
stay where they are for the moment. It was simply because we could not get
together and handle our affairs. Now that we have established the basis under
which we can work please let us leave them where they are and let us try and
see how far we can work.
Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: On this statement,
Gentlemen, a lot depends on what the Ad Hoc Constitutional Committee is. I
agree indeed that regarding other Regions it was indeed a platform for
politicians, in the East it was not. I did not send politicians to it but be it
as it may, if we say we are going to continue then we must obviously get quite
satisfied the terms of running this thing properly. We have got to be able to
meet and I said it outside and I repeat it here, I, as the Military Governor of
the East cannot meet anywhere in Nigeria where there are Northern troops.
b. The events of 29 July and the issue of Supreme Commander: the
Colonels speak.
Major Johnson: Sir, before we go
on if I may say something. I am happy we have got to this point again. I had
wanted to take this Conference back all along because as my people say 'If you
still have lice in your head, there will still be blood on your fingers: ' May
I ask one question, gentlemen, is there a Central Government in Nigeria to-day?’
Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: That question is
such a simple one and anyone who has been listening to what I have been saying
all the time would know that I do not see a Central Government in Nigeria
to-day.
Major Johnson: Thank you,
Gentlemen. I think this is the crux of the whole thing and I think if I can
take you back this can be a personality clash or something. I am saying here
to-day that this is the backbone of our problem. As far as the Governor of the
East is concerned there is no central government in Nigeria. You say, Supreme
Commander, but as far as he is concerned there is no Supreme Commander. I think
this is where we must start from, gentlemen. Why is he not accepting that there
is a Supreme Commander and we accept there is a Supreme Commander? This brings
me to this Conference that was held in August. As was rightly said, this
Committee was a Steering Committee. We are all Military personnel here and we
know one thing. We have all been pointing accusing fingers at politicians that
they used to take military decisions without military men. The main problem now
is that as far as the East is concerned, there is no Central Government. Why?
This is what we must find out. I mentioned something about personality clash. I
remember that there was a long letter written by the Governor of the East
sometime ago referring to the hierarchy in the Army, the policy on seniority
and things like that. He said among other things in the letter that if even
Lt.-Col. Yakubu Gowon is Supreme Commander is he not right to ask whether it is
for a period or something. For all the East knows the former Supreme Commander
is only missing and until such a time that they know his whereabouts they do
not know any other Supreme Commander. These are the points that have been
brought out by the East. Gentlemen, we said this morning that we have come with
open minds and we must hit the nail at the head. The East should tell us now what
are their views, what are the conditions they want to demand before they can
say that there is a Central Government in Nigeria. For all we know now, nobody
has seceded, the East is still part of Nigeria, the West, the North and we know
Nigeria as a Federation.
Lt.-Col. Ejoor: The Mid-West
please.
Major Johnson: And Lagos. Nigeria
is still a Federation and in a Federation there is a Central Government. Where
is this Central Government and who is Head of this Central Government?
Gentlemen, unless we clear this one, all what we are discussing will not be
good enough. What are the conditions the East demand before they can recognise
what the rest of us recognise as the Central Government?
Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: I agree with you
in essence on what you have just said, Bolaji [First name of Major Johnson],
but the last bit is badly put. If you will forgive me it is not 'What
conditions do they demand before....' If the problem is that we are trying to
see how to solve the problem of Government in the centre then I will come in. I
will seek your indulgence as I go a little bit back into what a number of
people would perhaps wish to call history. At a certain stage, we all accepted
General Ironsi as the Supreme Commander and Head of the National Military
Government. During his regime we met or rather whilst he was about we met as
often as it was practicable, and sat and jointly discussed and took decisions.
When the decisions were good we all shared the kudos, when those decisions were
bad it is only natural that we should all share the blame. On the 29th of July,
whilst he was visiting the Governor of the West, he was said to be besieged in
that residence in Ibadan and later kidnapped, further abducted. Subsequent to
that, it appeared in his absence the normal thing was whoever is the next
senior person to manage the affairs of this country until such a time as he
reappeared; or it was necessary he was deposed or if he had suffered certain
accident, until such a time as the circumstances were made known. Whichever is
the case, the question of the headship of the Government and the Supreme
Commander of the Armed Forces would normally be subjected to a discussion and
agreement unless, of course, one party felt he was strong enough to push
everybody aside and get to the seat. When this affair of the 29th July
occurred, I remember for certain, the first 24 hours nobody thought it
necessary to contact the East from Lagos. I made the contact later and I know
the advice I gave Brigadier Ogundipe at that time. I said to him, 'Sir, the
situation is so confused that I feel that somebody must take control
immediately. Also, I would suggest that you go on to the air and tell the
country what has happened and that you were taking control of the situation.'
Then I was told about concern for the whole country. I knew that if this thing
resolved itself into factions we would get ourselves into so much trouble that
we would never or we would find it difficult to get out. I maintained and still
do that the answer would have been for the responsible officers of the Army to
get together thereby trying to get the Army together to solve the problem that
we had on our hands. I said to him 'As soon as you have made your speech I
guarantee you within 30 minutes, I needed time to write my own, in 30 minutes I
would come on to the air in the East and say that I, the entire Army in the
East and the entire people in the East wholeheartedly support you.' Forgive me,
David [first name of Lt.-Col. Ejoor], that I have never said this to you, but I
told him too that I was sure that within fifteen minutes you would say the same
in the interest of the country as a whole. He told me that he thought it was a
good idea but it did not seem likely that it would be accepted by the faction.
Very soon after, I had occasion to talk to you, Jack [nickname of Lt.-Col.
Gowon], I did mention amongst other things, two things. The first one was this
question of solving the problem and I thought the Army together should solve
it. I said also that any break at this time from our normal line would write in
something into the Nigerian Army which is bigger than all of us and that thing
is indiscipline. How can you ride above people's heads and sit in Lagos purely
because you are at the Head of a group who have their fingers poised on the
trigger? If you do it you remain forever a living example of that indiscipline
which we want to get rid of because tomorrow a Corporal will think because he
has his finger on the trigger he could just take over the company from the
Major Commanding the company and so on. I knew then that we were heading for
something terrible. Despite that and by force of circumstance as we did talk on
the telephone, I think twice, you brought up the question of supreme command
and I made quite plain my objections, but despite those objections you
announced yourself as the Supreme Commander. Now, Supreme Commander by virtue
of the fact that you head or that you are acceptable to people who had mutinied
against their Commander, kidnapped him and taken him away? By virtue of the
support of Officers and men who had in the dead of night murdered their brother
Officers, by virtue of the fact that you stood at the head of a group who had
turned their brother Officers from the Eastern Region out of the barracks which
they shared? Our people came home; there are other circumstances which even
make the return more tragic. Immediately after I had opportunity to speak to
you again, I said on that occasion that there had been too much killing in
Nigeria and it was my sincere hope that we can stop these killings. I said
then, and have continued to say that in the interest of peace I would
co-operate with you to stop the fighting, to stop the killing but I would not
recognise. I would not recognise because as I said we have a Supreme Commander
who is missing. I would not recognise and to underline the validity of that
claim of mine you appointed another Officer, be he senior to you, Acting
Governor in the West, presumably acting for the Governor who was then abducted
and that I saw no reason why your position would not then be acting. From there
I think we started parting our ways because it was clear that the hold on Lagos
was by force of conquest. Now, these things do happen in the world, we are all
military Officers. If an Officer is dead 'Oh! he was a fine soldier', we drop
the national flag on him; we give him due honours and that is all. The next
person steps in. So, the actual fact in itself is a small thing with military
men but hierarchy, order is very important, discipline are sine qua non for any
organisation which prides itself for being called an Army. So, the mutiny had
occurred, the mutineer seemed in control of the North, the West, Lagos. By
international standards when that does happen then a de facto situation is
created immediately where whoever is in a position get a de facto recognition
of himself in a position over the area he controls. In this situation, Nigeria
resolved itself into three areas. The Lagos, West and North group, the
Mid-West, the East. What should have been done is for us to get round to
discuss the future, how to carry on in the absence of our Supreme Commander. We
could not get together because of the situation so we sent our accredited
representatives, delegates of Governments and personal representatives of
Governors to Lagos to try and resolve certain issues on bringing normalcy to
the country. They met and unanimously agreed to certain points. Bolaji, I think
in fact from this, if nothing else you do know what I consider went wrong.
Perhaps at this juncture I might stop for others to contribute otherwise I
would go on and tell you what I consider to be my solution to the problem even
now, irrespective of the amount of water that had gone under the bridge. I
think there is still a solution provided we are honest with ourselves and we
are really very serious about solving this problem. I agree with you it is
vital, it is crucial, without it I do not think we can really go anywhere. I
leave it for the time being.
Col. Adebayo: I think Emeka has
narrated what happened on the 29th July and thereafter. We have all agreed and
I am sure you still agree that what we are looking for now is a solution for
the future. I do not want us to go into the past anymore, we want a solution
for the future. I will suggest with the permission of the other members here
that we ask Emeka to give us his solution. Thereafter there might be some
others too who would have their own solutions, then we can make a compromise
from the solutions we get.
Lt.-Col. Hassan: Gentlemen, General
Ankrah told us not to go back into the past, if we are to go back into the past
we will sit here for two months talking. Let us forget the past and I agree
with Robert [first name of Col. Adebayo] that we ask the East to tell us their
solution. If their solution is quite acceptable then we adopt it, amend or
whatever we think is good for the country for peace. We are not going to say
ourselves what efforts we have put in individually; let us find peace for
Nigeria. This is the major issue, unless this is done whatever we are going to
discuss is not going to work out well.
Lt.-Col. Ejoor: I believe that
before we start suggesting solutions we must examine certain principles vis a
vis the Governors. To me, we should not go too far into history but there is
one valid point which must be considered and that is the coup we have had so
far. The January 15 one was a failure and the Army came in to correct it, the
one of the 29th I personally believe was a mutiny to start with but it has now
turned out to be a coup. If it is a coup we have to ask ourselves 'is it a
successful coup or is it a partial one ?' I believe it is a partial one; it is
not a fully successful one. This is the main point which has brought us here,
trying to negotiate as opposed to receiving orders from the Commander. I think
we must bear this in mind in reaching a decision or a Resolution affecting the
re-organisation of the Army. To-day, the Army is faced with four main problems.
Firstly, the problem of leadership; Secondly, the crisis of confidence amongst
Officers and amongst the soldiers; Thirdly, the chain of command is badly
disrupted; and Fourthly, we cannot now have any Nigerian from anywhere serving
in the same unit as an effective unit of the Army. These are bare facts and
whatever solution we evolve must go to solve these main problems. I leave these
basic principles and what solutions offered should be considered alongside
these problems.
Lt.-Col. Hassan: David spoke on
re-organisation but the current topic is on Bolaji's point which Emeka
narrated. I think this is the major point.
Lt.-Col. Ejoor: When you consider
leadership you have to tell us what happened to the former leader.
Commodore Wey: Gentlemen, I think
I have been properly placed in this issue from the 15th of January up till now.
Unfortunately, I do not put them down because I think I can carry quite a bit
in my head. The whole issue is unfortunate, it has happened and it has
happened. The truth now is that we want to repair, we do not intend to point
accusing fingers at anybody. When the trouble of the 29th July started I was
present, you came and joined us, therefore, I can tell any other person better.
I was there when you phoned Brigadier Ogundipe and I knew what you said. At one
stage, it was even said that I carried him in my ship and took him out to sea.
I must say one thing that it is impossible for any man to expect to command any
unit which he has not got control over. Bolaji would bear witness, he was
there, he started it. He was the one who went out first and came back to say
that a Private refused to take orders from him; it all happened in the Police
Headquarters. The Inspector-General complained, I went into it and I said if
they cannot take orders from an Army Officer like themselves they will not take
from a Naval Officer. I retired and called Brigadier Ogundipe. He went out and
if an ordinary Sergeant can tell a Brigadier 'I do not take orders from you,
until my Captain comes,' I think this was the limit and this is the truth about
it. Therefore, it would have been very unfair to Ogundipe or any other person
for that matter to take command and there is no point accepting to command a
unit over which you have no control. It was after that negotiations started, I
do not know what conversation went on between Ogundipe and Jack. On the long
run I was consulted and what I have just said now was exactly my advice. Bob
was with me, I went out and we did not finish until two o'clock in the morning.
Jack then came into the issue, how he got there I have got the story; he himself
has never told me. I have been doing private investigations myself. I knew how
he got into Ikeja and how it came about. I want to repeat that if we did not
have the opportunity of having Jack to accept, God knows we would have been all
finished. If you remember, you dragged me out, things changed. I do not think
people can appreciate the difficulty we were in, therefore, if anybody accepted
to lead them candidly I doff my hat for him, I accept it purely from the point
of respect. If 55 million people can be saved let us forget everything about
position and for God's sake because of our 55 million people let us forget our
personal pride. Whether it was a coup or a mutiny let us forget it. If this man
comes out and everybody accepts him, please let us accept him. One thing I
would like to repeat, I am a sailor and I want to remain a sailor. I do not see
why you soldiers should not remain soldiers. We were not trained to be
politicians, let us run the Government, draw up a Constitution, hand-over to the
politicians and we get back into our uniforms. Whatever people may say, I think
I will take this advantage to tell you here that when all of you were appointed
Governors I was one of those who sat and appointed you Governors but right does
not come into this at all; please let us forget personal feelings. I know my
rank but if it is the wish of the 55 million people, please let us put our
hearts into our pockets and forget our personal pride. Personally, I am 100 per
cent in support that we should mention the whereabouts of Ironsi, even I have
advised on this. When that has been done, he is a Head of State and he should
be given the proper honour; thereafter, who-so-ever is in the Chair now let us
help him to run the country peacefully, no more bloodshed, we have shed enough.
We cannot create why should we destroy? If we can help to save please let us do
so but we must say the whereabouts of Ironsi. He is a Head of State and we
should give him his due respect as a Head of State. It is a temporary issue,
four, five years, maybe I would have retired by then.
Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: It is all well and
good, Gentlemen, but I will be vehement on this. The point is that if a room is
dirty you do not sweep the dirt under the carpet because whenever you raise the
carpet the dirt will be there. It is not so simple as all that. Indeed, on the
very principle that you have enunciated here, it is a question of command and
control. I like to know who will stand up here and tell me that he commands and
controls the Eastern Army or the Army in the East.
Lt.-Col. Hassan: You alone.
Commodore Wey: I can tell you
also here now that you are doing it illegally because when we had the first
Government no Governor was supposed to have the command of any Army.
Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: You have started
on the basis of the principles of command and control. If you control a group
who will take orders from you, according to you, everybody doffs his hat, well
done. Right, that person you doff your hat to cannot command and control those
under him and indeed those of the East. What do you do to that?
Commodore Wey: That is why we are
here.
Lt.-Col. Hassan: This is why we are
here to solve the problem. You command the East, if you want to come into
Nigeria come into Nigeria and that is that.
Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: I am not out.
Lt.-Col. Hassan: This is the problem but if we are to go into the
basis of coup and mutiny we will be here for months. I have seen an Army mutiny
in Kano and if you see me trembling you will know what a mutiny is. You were
the first I rang and for two good days I saw a real mutiny when a C.O. of
Northern origin commanding soldiers of Northern origin had to run away. Please,
we have all come not to raise issues of the past, let us forget the past and
come to the problem. Say what you want to say, let us go into the matter and
discuss it.
Mr. T. Omo-Bare: Before we ask
Emeka to give a solution will it not be advisable that somebody should say what
happened to Ironsi.
Major Johnson: I support him
fully.
Alhaji Kam Selem: If I may just say
a few words. I am not a military man, but at that time it was just impossible
for anybody else to take command of the country. As far as I know even the
present Supreme Commander had to be persuaded to take over the Government. The
Senior Officers you are talking about could not possibly accept the leadership
of the country at that time. What could we do in a situation like that and the
country was kept for 48 hours and nobody knew what was happening. As far as I
know he has no ambition to remain in this present post. As soon as the
situation in the country returns to normal and the problems are solved he will
resign. I associate myself with all the Governors who said we should give the
present Supreme Commander the respect he deserves. I was present through the whole
trouble from January 15 and most of the things took place in my office. As
other speakers said, if the Governor of the East has a solution let us hear the
solution.
Lt.-Col. Ejoor: Before we hear the
solution, we want to know what happened to Ironsi and Fajuyi. Lt.-Col. Gowon:
If a public statement is required I am prepared to make one now. I have never
been afraid to make a public statement anywhere. Left to me it would have been
announced the day I knew about it and immediately I took the people that should
know into confidence. I have explained this to my Colleagues in absolute
sincerity and honesty. I had wanted to make the announcement before this
meeting but unfortunately I was unable to do so. In any case, I want to make
this announcement very shortly, and if you require it now I will say it. If you
wish I can give the information in confidence and we can work on that.
Alhaji Kam Selem: I think the
statement should be made in Nigeria so that the necessary honour can be given.
Lt.-Col. Hassan: This was what
happened after the January coup. We agreed to announce the names of all the
Senior Officers killed but there was fear all over. Let us combine the whole
story ready, do the whole thing respectably and solve the problem.
Commodore Wey: Gentlemen, I would
like to suggest this. I do not think there is anybody sitting on this table who
would say that until today he did not know about the situation. In short, it is
a public statement that is required and now we are going to have it in the
scribe's book. We know the position and an announcement will be made as soon as
we get back home.
Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: On this question
of announcement and as you have all diagnosed, a lot depends on the public
statement. The longer it is kept everything would remain uncertain, so that it
is necessary to determine here how we are going to make this announcement.
When?
Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: I am not trying to
be difficult on the issue but perhaps you will agree that this issue affects
the area I am governing more than any other area. If it is in due course that
the announcement is going to be made I would respectfully suggest that a
statement would be in due course. Let us decide, if we want the Secretaries to
move out, they can move out. If we want everybody out, let them go out for five
minutes, the microphones can be taken away or we can move down there.
Gentlemen, if even the circumstances mean quite a lot, we can move away from
this table, have a quick chat and come back to continue.
Commodore Wey: I support that.
c. The problem of the army.
Lt.-Col. Gowon: I think all of us
have at one time or the other discussed the situation in the country with
regard to the reorganisation of the Army. With reference to 3 (b) 'the
implementation of the agreement reached on 9th August' this is on the
disposition of Army personnel, that they should go back to their region of
origin. This recommendation was made by the Ad Hoc Committee which consisted of
Secretaries to the Military Governors, advisers and representatives of Regional
Governors. They did not have any mandate to decide anything other than to come
and express their feelings and make recommendations. Their recommendations, of
course, would be considered by the Regional Governors. I think the recommendation
says: It was accordingly agreed that as far as possible the Army personnel
should be posted to barracks in their Regions of origin with immediate effect
as an interim measure. Having regard to its peculiar position, the question of
maintenance of peace and security in Lagos should be left with the Supreme
Commander in consultation with the Military Governors. This question of
movement of troops to their Region of origin arose from the fact that at the
time there was so much misunderstanding, so much clash and killings between
troops of Northern origin and troops of Eastern origin. I discussed this on the
telephone with Emeka and I told him that 'Honestly, my consideration is to save
the lives of these boys and the only way to do it is to remove the troops back
to barracks in their Region of origin ' Emeka also told me that there were a
number of threats to his life and any moment the troops in Enugu of Northern
origin could mutiny and his life and the lives of the people of Eastern Nigeria
would be in danger. I agreed with him and said the best thing we could do was
to send them back to their Region of origin and some of the boys were already
escaping from their units. We agreed to repatriate all troops of Northern
origin from the East and those of Eastern origin particularly Ibo speaking from
the other major units because the clashes were severest within major units. As
far as I was concerned I did not think the problem was in other units because
the feeling at that time was that it was the Northern versus Eastern boys as a
result of some things that had happened in the past which had been with us for
a long time. If you remember, Emeka, you said something about the boys in the
services returning and I agreed to this reluctantly but as far as the major units
were concerned, I thought that was necessary. If we can mix up a little now
this will certainly be a good basis for future coming together. If we separate
totally we will sort of probably get further and further apart and each Region
may have an independent Army. I think I have said enough as far as the review
of the current situation with reference to the organisation of the Army is
concerned and the implementation of the agreement of 9th August. I think we can
now discuss this point and later on come to some sort of agreement on the
subject....
Lt.-Col. Gowon: I think we can now
go to the question of the organisation of the Nigerian Army. There was a
Committee that was set up in August or September to think on the re-
organisation of the Nigerian Army and I think they produced a paper which we
sent to all Military Governors to comment upon and from that we will work out
the question of re-organisation. This is something on a nation's security and I
think we should be very careful about it. This is the truth about defence in
the world today. If I can say something about my idea for the re-organisation
of the Army. I will be very brief. I think that the Nigerian Army today
probably would not be able to remain exactly as it was before January 15 or
July 29. There has been so much fear generated between ourselves as a result of
events since the beginning of 1966 that there is something to be said towards
the modification of the present stand. There are two extremes on this. One sort
of saying that we remain exactly as we were before January 15 and the other
which says, we go completely on Regional basis. I think those are the two
extremes. In the middle of course, you have got the possibility of having an
Army predominantly people of that Region in their Region. If I can express my
own view or if you like you can call it my philosophy. As far as the Nigerian
Army is concerned we cannot get everybody to where he was before January 15 or
July 29. If we want to go to the other extreme of having Regional Armies we are
trying to have the beginning of the arms race which is what we are trying to do
away with. These Regional Armies will turn into private armies and before we
know what we are doing we will start having internal troubles within the
private armies and, of course, the whole country will be in flames. My thinking
is that I do not feel that the basis of trust and confidence has been
completely broken, it has been disrupted, it has been shaken but with little
mixing and jingling we have got between people, I am quite convinced that it
would form the basis of probably a more realistic mixing together in the
future. If every Region wants to go its own way and think one day we will meet
again, I feel that it may not work properly.... On immediate re-organisation, one
would like to see first of all proper command and control. Secondly, we all
agreed that most of the soldiers in each Region should come from that Region.
The East and the Mid-West are lucky they have all their people there,
unfortunately in the West, I have not got enough Westerners in the place and
the people in the West are very afraid now because a lot of their own people
were killed during January, July and August. I have tried to clear the fear
from them but still they insist on having more Yorubas than they have at the
moment. I know there are not enough Yorubas in the Army and those who are there
are mostly tradesmen. I do not want to disrupt other units, but from what I
said when we last met in Lagos, we can find an immediate solution to the Yoruba
problem. That is, try and continue on the normal quota business which we
started in Zaria and as a crash programme we should use Abeokuta area as a
crash programme training centre for Westerners, for Mid-Westerners who cannot
go to Zaria and possibly for the Easterners who cannot go to Zaria at the
moment. I still feel very strongly about this, this is the only way to clear
the problem of the Yorubas and this is the only way we can get the confidence
of the people of the West because they feel they are the only people now being
helped because there are not enough Yorubas in the Army. The moment we can
clear this side and we get command and control properly established, I do not
think there will be any more problem That is the immediate reorganisation which
I would like now but the long term one is on the paper given to us by the
committee which was appointed. It is a very good paper and I am still
commenting on it.
d. The information media blame.
Lt.-Col. Gowon: On the Government
Information Media, I think all the Government Information Media in the country
have done terribly bad. Emeka would say the New
Nigerian has been very unkind to the East
Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: And the Post which I pay for.
Lt.-Col. Gowon: Sometime I feel my
problem is not with anyone but the Outlook.
Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: All the other
information media have done a lot. When the Information Media in a country
completely closed their eyes to what was happening, I think it is a dangerous
thing.
Major Johnson: Let us agree it is
the situation.
Lt.-Col. Ejoor: All of them have
committed one crime or the other.
Lt.-Col. Hassan: The Outlook is the worst of them.
Lt.-Col. Ojukwu:The Outlook is not the worst, the Post which we all in fact pay for is the
worst followed closely by the New Nigerian.
Mr. T. Omo-Bare: Let us make a
general statement on all of them, no distinction. Lt.-Col. Gowon I think we
agreed that all Government Information Media should desist from making
inflammatory publications that would worsen the situation in the country.
e. The administrative arrangements for the future.
Lt.-Col. Gowon: I personally think
Decree 34 is worth looking into. I agree that the Supreme Military Council
should sit on this, I think even in one of my addresses I said I would do away
with any Decree that certainly tended to go towards too much centralisation and
if you feel strongly about this, very good, they can be looked into. I think we
will resurrect this one when we go back home and take decisions on them.
Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: We will not
discuss the details but I am anxious that we find solutions. Whatever we do
here we set a time for because there has been so much going on. What I am
bringing up at this meeting are the things which generate the sort of suspicion
we are trying very hard to avoid. If we can set a time limit I would be
agreeable that all the parts of Decrees and Decrees that assume over-centralisation
will be repealed.
Commodore Wey: Will be looked
into, supposing it is a good one?
Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: Centralisation is
a word that stinks in Nigeria to-day. For that 10,000 people have been
killed....
Lt.-Col. Hassan: We are not going
back on the question of Government. I think we better make it clear what form
of Government because up till now Emeka has been saying he does not recognise
the Federal Government of Nigeria. This is the main point. Let us make it
clear, is the East agreeing to the present Federal Government? If not what is
the East thinking should be the form of Federal Government?
Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: I have said that a
Government by a Council run perhaps the same as we have to-day with a Chairman
with limited powers and we limit the powers here....
Col. Adebayo: I do not think we
should flog this thing too much. I think quite rightly a lot of powers of the
Regions have been taken from them by centralising most of them, this was by
some of the Decrees made by Lagos before 29th July. I think this must be looked
into, the Decrees repealed and the powers must go back to the Regions.
Mr. T. Omo-Bare: Why not use the
word, reviewed. We can hold a meeting when we get back home and review these
Decrees.
Col. Adebayo: Can we then say
that all our Solicitors-General get together and discuss these Decrees?
Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: Let us go through
the points we know, we know we had a Federation before 15th January, the powers
go back to the Regions and from there we try to put things right. All this talk
about review, review and for the next six months they will not be reviewed.
Commodore Wey: As far as I am
concerned this Government is known as the Military Government and all the
Decrees produced so far were produced by the Army, therefore, let us not blame
ourselves, let us look into the Decrees and find the ones we can send back. You
were in the Council when we made these Decrees.
Alhaji Kam Selem: I think the point
he made is good but it is not a matter for us to decide. We have to look into
these things. Let the Solicitors-General meet, bring their lists and put up
recommendations.
Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: The 'legal boys'
have looked into it and said 'repeal'. If some 'legal boys' in some regions
refuse to work it is not my fault. These are the things that cause a lot of
trouble.
Col. Adebayo: Let us give them a
date when they should meet....
Mr. T. Omo-Bare: The Governors
should go back and tell their men to meet at Benin on a certain date.
Lt.-Col. Hassan: The Ministry of
Justice in Lagos.
Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: He will give the
instruction in Lagos and I will give the instruction in Enugu.
Lt.-Col. Hassan: Lagos is the one
to say let us meet at such and such a date.
Col. Adebayo: We are giving them
instruction from this meeting.
Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: It is not Lagos.
This is the crucial point about this Government.
Lt.-Col. Hassan: Let us take this
question honestly, the East has not recognised the Federal Government, I think
you better secede and let the three of us join together.
Lt.-Gen. Ankrah: There is no
question of secession when you come here.
Col. Adebayo: What he is saying
is that let this meeting decide on the date they are meeting somewhere and when
we get back home we will tell our Solicitors-General that they are meeting at
such and such a date.
Major Johnson: We can take a date
here but I see what Lt.-Col. Hassan is getting at. Usually anything you do in a
Federal Government, instructions come from the nerve centre and that nerve
centre for all we know is Lagos. It is Lagos that will tell the Regions 'You
send your Solicitors-General to meet at Benin at so and so date....'
Personally, I feel we have a duty to the people, we should forget about
ourselves at the moment. We must put behind our minds that we are all soldiers
and we are all likely to go back to the Army after this. All we need now is to
find a solution to the problem of Nigeria and that solution must be a sincere
one.... I know the Ghana system is working well; if we had started with that
system from the beginning it would have been a different thing. There is
nothing wrong with our own system, only the timing is bad, it will be bad if we
change it now and I think we must make our own organisation workable....
Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: I have to come in
again. I do not agree with 90 per cent of what you have just said. I have used
the analogy of sweeping dirt under the carpet, I again used the question of the
ostrich posture burying our heads in the sand and hoping everything is all
right. The fact remains that in the year 1966, Nigeria has gone through a
turmoil and as Jack himself said, the basis for real unity in this..
Lt.-Col. Gowon: Unitary system of
Government, please, not the question of unity.
Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: You made an
important and realistic declaration in which you said' Our difficulties in the
past have been how to agree on the form which such an association should take
and the task of my Government', meaning yours, 'is to provide facilities for
the widest and fullest consultations at all levels on all vital matters of
national interest before a decision is taken.' In the past we have been too
presumptuous and have acted on such presumptions. Too often we presume that we
know what the people desired. In one or two cases hasty decisions were taken
without sufficient consultation. Based on that and knowing what has gone,
therefore any government set up now in Nigeria that does not take into
cognisance Regional loyalties is complete eye-wash. The Federal Government or
support of Gowon or support of anybody, or of Emeka, whatever it is, is neither
here nor there. What we want is that certain things were wrong, what are they,
let us put them right. When I said Chairman, you can call him Chairman and
still call him Governor. The fact still remains, it is really a nomenclature on
functions and this is the crux of the matter. On the basis on which he assumed
the position in Lagos, it is not possible for the East to accept blindly the
leadership from Lagos. For this we have fought, we have struggled for in the
past few years. For this the East will continue to struggle and fight if
necessary, but thank God we have said there will be no force.
Lt.-Col. Gowon: You can thank God
but your attitude is what will say.
Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: The point I am
making is that this Council of ours whoever we decide should sit on the Chair
would have limited functions and only act with our agreement. This was what
caused the last downfall. We all know it, there were so many times that we quarrelled
about this, argued about this, a number of things went down and not fully
understood elsewhere. After all, we were all there when Decree No. 34 was made.
The point was, amongst the Governors and senior officers, we knew, and we saw
it and left it. The people did not, they felt it and re-acted, so we are told.
If we are not going to fall into that trap again let us here agree that whoever
sits on the chair can only act after consultation . . . and his action would,
of course, be limited by our own agreement.... The question of Government,
Gentlemen. It would be entirely unrealistic not to take into full cognisance
what has happened in the country. There was a mutiny in the Army on January 15,
Army leaders from all parts of the country got together halted it and set up a
Government. Until May there was a massacre which the Army leaders in their
entirety regretted; based on the good faith generated by the realistic way in
which the Army or the Armed Forces tackled the problem, it was possible for
populations to continue to go back to their areas of domicile and continue
living side by side with one another. Come July, there was another mutiny in
the Army as a result of which Jack assumed the title Supreme Commander. This
title certainly is contrary to my own views as a member of the Supreme Military
Council.... By September the molestations and the killings of Easterners had
assumed such large proportions that Easterners everywhere outside the East lost
complete faith in a Federal Government that could not offer the basic need to
their citizen, that is to offer the citizen protection. The citizens from the
East, therefore, sought that protection within their ethnic groups in the East.
Contrary to sentiments and all advice, everybody thought the East was going to
revenge. I will say this here because it is no boast that but for my own
personality in the crisis the East would have thrown itself completely into a
revenge. I halted it because I foresaw that anybody that started an
inter-tribal civil war would never be able to control it. I was absolutely
certain that once we get into civil war it would take us at least 25 years to
sort out. Contrary to all expectation I sent our delegates from the East to the
Ad Hoc Constitutional Conference. During this, contrary to what should have
been indeed the Military Government's way of doing things, I think a genuine
mistake, politicians found themselves for the first time in the forefront of
national discussions and, as usual instead of facing the problem before them sought
to gain personal triumphs and advantage. The East at the Conference was not
doing very well, the molestations continued, the gory details I will spare
you.... In this case unfortunately, Gentlemen, Officers and men of Eastern
Nigeria origin who had moved from other parts of the country know the names,
the faces of individuals who perpetrated these atrocities. Mention a name, we
know who killed him, mention somebody we know who at least hounded him out of
his barracks. So, Gentlemen, for as long as that situation exists men from
Eastern Nigeria would find it utterly impossible to stay in the same barracks,
feed in the same mess, fight from the same trenches as men in the Army from
Northern Nigeria, they would find this impossible because we know it. My policy
has been that of ensuring the prevention of further killing. If we do not take
cognisance of all these and we put our men together and mix up we write in
Gentlemen, vendetta into our Armed Forces and once it becomes vendetta it
becomes extremely difficult for us to solve because they will stay by force in
the same barracks but each Commanding Officer will never be sure when his day
will come. For these basic reasons, separation of the forces, the separation of
the population, I, in all sincerity, in order to avoid further friction and
further killing, do submit that the only realistic form of Government to-day
until tempers can cool is such that will move people slightly apart and a
Government that controls the various entities through people of their areas. It
is better that we move slightly apart and survive, it is much worse that we
move closer and perish in the collision. Therefore, I say no single one person
to-day in Nigeria can command the entire loyalty of the people of Nigeria.
People can command loyalties of various groups and, therefore, to save the
suspicion, to enable us settle down it is essential that whatever form of
Government we have in the centre must be limited and controlled by a consensus
which we all agree. It is easier for people at the top to be reasonable, it is
a different thing for people lower down and it is that that makes me say that
Nigeria wide content should be at the highest possible level until such a time
as tempers have cooled and tensions have come down. This is the basic
principle, if we are agreeable on it then we go into the matters of detail.
Lt.-Col. Hassan: I do agree
basically with the principles that have been mentioned by Emeka, but starting
from May, I think, in his statement and in what you mentioned earlier, we that
are here to-day know what we have done and we know what we have been doing to
console and to stop the killings of the people of the East. On the other side,
you may not know that all of us here on this table have done so much also,
risking our lives and, as you mentioned, the whole thing is at the lower level.
If you know how much it is at the lower level and how much we have tried to
console the people to stop all these movements and mass killings, you will give
me and others a medal tonight. However, I do agree that at the moment the
confidence at the lower level has to be restored and it will take time to get
confidence because it is a known fact that the confidence now both in the East
and in the North is not yet there. We have tried our best to see that the
ordinary man in the street understands the difficulties as already mentioned by
Emeka that may face the country, a complete civil war. However, we have done
our best and we will continue to do our best but all the same I agree that
whatever form of association we are to discuss has to be at the top; to make me
believe that tomorrow a Northern soldier will stay in the same barracks within
the next few months with an Eastern soldier, the confidence is just not there.
With the civilians I would agree because there are so many that have written to
us, we have so many from the East who still want to come back but I cannot
really say to them 'It is true, go and reside in such and such a place' because
if he comes back and something happens to him I will have the feeling that it
is my responsibility to save the life of that individual and I told him to come
back and he has been killed.
Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: The Easterner who
wanted to come back to the North I tried actively to stop because I know the
Easterner, I know what he is going to do when he goes back to the North and I
would be grateful if you discourage him.
Lt.-Col. Hassan: I encouraged some
and discouraged some because I feel it is my responsibility. This was what made
me face the mutiny in Kano, soldiers were ready to shoot me but all the same it
is my responsibility to save lives and I did it. However, I feel that on the
civilian side we can do it gradually but at the Army level that will give us
great difficulty. I feel we should concentrate now on the form of association
we want at the higher level not promises that an Eastern soldier and a Northern
soldier can mix together tomorrow, the chances of their mixing together is
about 35 per cent but not up to 45 per cent yet. I think that the form of
Government that we should have should be discussed at the higher level and then
we can try within our territories to bring confidence back gradually. We may
say that the confidence is there but right at the bottom it is not there and I
am sure Robert will]l agree. Even right now we have divisions within the
Regions in the North, the West, the Mid-West, even in the East, the Rivers
people want to go. Therefore, we better try to keep the big groups together at
the moment and gradually we start mixing together.
Lt.-Col. Ejoor: I do not think I
will recount the details which have been mentioned but the salient point which
we want to consider is that since there is no one person that has absolute
control of the Armed Forces, it is now difficult for us to accept one authority
and I think this is the main point which Emeka has tried to make. We can tackle
it in two ways. First, by removing the subject of objection in the lower group,
that is by separating the soldiers in the mean time to build confidence until
we can bring them together. Secondly, since we are working in good faith among
ourselves we have to repose the responsibility for each group of the Army on
those personalities until we are in a position to merge together. With this
progression from a Federal set up it only means we have to look very closely
into the central powers which are supposed to be those of the Supreme Commander
and see how best we can limit these in such a way that the actions are
acceptable, to the various Regions. I would like this body to be maintained,
the Supreme Military Council must be maintained but we have to reconstruct the
duties or the powers of the Supreme Military Council in order to give effect to
the other functions that will restore confidence within the various Regions and
then in general. I do not think our answer here is to start re- organising the
Council but to look into the functions and to specify very definitely what it
can do and what it cannot do. If we do that we would go a long way in restoring
confidence within the Regions. When this is restored we hope gradually we shall
build up, it will be a matter of time and it will come automatically but we
will want a strong centre....
Col. Adebayo: I think I should
come in here. Two points have been made, one on the Government side and the
second which is inter-related to the Government side, the Army. This is a
Military Government or Military rule and as such we are military people and
must get ourselves together first. If we do not sort ourselves out I cannot see
how we can confidently rule the country. I agree entirely with Emeka, Hassan
and David. I think it will be simpler on the Government side if we can restore
the confidence of the population which we have not got at the moment. Even in
the West the Yorubas are afraid of moving around with the Northern troops
because they feel 'Well, they have done something to the Easterners may be it
is our turn next....' I think I would agree with the majority here that our
association should be tightened up at the top and see whether we can bring that
association down to the ground when the time comes, when the troops have more
confidence in themselves. As Jack and myself have always said, we do not want
to break the Army completely into pieces because it will be very very dangerous
to any one of us if we break the Army into pieces. If we can tighten up the
Army on top then those who are on top will gradually have the confidence of the
troops back but I agree entirely that we must separate these troops. If there
are areas where some people can work together, we can go into detail on that
but in general I think one should agree that there should be separation from
the bottom but not on top. On the Government side, the problem has been half
resolved. We agreed yesterday that our Solicitors-General should get together
on the 14th and see what part of the Decrees we can repeal later on and submit
their recommendations. I think if we can go back as at 14th January, 1966, I think
half of the problem on the Government side is resolved. Then if we want to go
through the functions of the Supreme Commander and see what the Regions can
take on it will be all right. But, personally, I would say we only repeal those
Decrees that were passed after 15th January, 1966 but I think we should revert
to what the country was as at 14th January, 1966, that is Regional autonomy.
Lt.-Col. Ejoor: On that point, the
implication is that the Civilian Government will have to come back.
Col. Adebayo: What we are doing
is that we are trying to get a solution for us Military people to rule, the
question of civilians coming back is a different exercise altogether. You
repeal all the Decrees made that affected some of the powers of the Regional
Governments. In fact Decree No. 1 is one of them, there are certain parts of
Decree No. 1 which should be repealed.... We can go through all the Decrees
that have been passed, that will solve our problems and bring the Regional
powers back to the Regions.... If we agree on that I see no reason why we
should go through the functions and the powers of the Supreme Commander because
at the Supreme Military Council a joint decision is always made but
unfortunately we could not meet since July 29 and there are areas in which the
Federal Executive Council in Lagos could meet without the Regional Governors
but on things affecting the Regions the Regional Governors must either attend
the meeting or be consulted before passing it into law. If we all agree that we
repeal Decrees that affect Regional powers and leave the Supreme Military Council
to continue and the Federal Executive Council to continue I think half of our
job is done.
Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: Again, whilst I
agree with Bob I think what he has said has not gone far enough. It has not
gone far enough in that before January 15 certainly the Armed Forces were one.
These are crucial to whatever we decide to do and, therefore, whilst I agree
that the Supreme Military Council should stay, I feel that here we must write
it down in our decisions quite categorically that the legislative and executive
authority of the Federal Military Government shall be vested in the Supreme
Military Council because previously it had been vested in the Supreme
Commander.
Col. Adebayo: No.
Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: The actions have
been such.
Col. Adebayo: Actions, yes.
Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: If we are not
going to get ourselves into another friction, I think this must really be spelt
out, 80 that, what I envisage is that whoever is at the top is a constitutional
chap, constitutional within the context of the Military Government. That is, he
is the titular head but he would only act when we have met and taken a
decision. It is in fact for that reason that I suggested yesterday, so as not
to get it confused ever again, that whoever we choose should be the Chairman of
a Military Council. Indeed, I have gone on to say or rather I would like to say
that he should again be a Titular Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and
that he shall perform such functions as are performed by a Constitutional Head
of State. By so doing we have limited the powers, by so doing our people will
have the confidence that whatever he says must at least have been referred to
us all and that we are doing it in the best interest of the entirety rather
than saying that this chap is there he is a Northerner and suspect every action
of his, this chap is there an Easterner, he must be pushing only Eastern things
for the Eastern good. If we spell it out as I have just said I think we would
go a long way. I will go further and I will give you the papers of what I suggest.
Papers passed to Members of the Supreme Military Council.
Major Johnson: Before we go into
the details of this, I would like to add one or two points.... We must first of
all face the social problems in our country. What you have just enumerated, I
am sure, in principle has been the intention of the Federal Military Government
since January. General Ironsi, all of us will remember, used to say 'Look, it
is easy to be a dictator but it is not easy to try not to be one.' There are
several occasions when he would say 'Look, we all take these decisions' even at
Council meetings and putting his hand down he would say 'any comments.' I am
sure this has been the genuine intention of everybody in the Military
Government, nobody wants to be a dictator. I know there could be technical
hitches, that in practice we have deviated from it but from what you have said
I am sure it is the intention of every military member here, nobody has got any
personal aspiration, we are all just longing to get this country back on its
feet. So, the decisions being taken jointly I am sure is everybody's welcome.
The nomenclature now is something different. Again, I tie this one up with
social. This is why I believe, let us remain with the nomenclature we have got.
Supreme Military Council, Federal Executive Council, Regional Executive
Council, these are what we are talking about but it is within us. We have said
now that we must start this thing from the top. If we know we want unity
eventually which we know cannot be built now it is from the top and if we do
not show the genuine intention right from the top I do not see what we are
going to pass on to the lower people. Those of us here now should know how we
want it to be functioning. We know we have agreed, we are going to put it down
there that Supreme Commander you will be the man in Lagos to do normal day to
day things that were done by the Ministers and this should be carried out with
Members of the Executive Council in Lagos. He never takes any decision by
himself for all I know although there could be some hitches as I have said and
things to include the Regions the Regional Governments will come in and if it
is not important they send a memo for them to comment. We say this is what we
have agreed upon and it goes on. I do not think we should deviate from this....
Gentlemen, it is not anybody's intention to remain head-up in Nigeria, it is
not anybody's ambition that he wants to be Governor. It has come on us and we
are doing national service now for our country. When they talk about the
history of Nigeria because after all 10 years in our lives is a long time but
in the life of a nation it, is a very small time. We are going to pass away one
day but what are we going to give to posterity, that is what we should think
about now. Personal ambition, what this man should be or that man, we must
forget it. I welcome what Col. Ojukwu said, we take a joint decision, that is
what we have been doing but the nomenclature I say, let it remain....The only
thing I would like to add is because of the state of the Army itself today I
would like to see an effective Commander of the Army. I would like to have an
effective Commander and on top of that I would like to see that we break the
command of the Army into Area commands. I hate to use Regional commands; I
would say Area commands and have effective command on the Area commands and
then an effective command for the Army itself. That will assist the Supreme
Commander himself from going into detail on Army matters. He can still be the
Head of the Armed Forces but that will assist him in going into detail on Army
problems. I do not think personally that the Chief of Staff (Army) is
effective. He is the Staff Officer, I was Chief of Staff, you were Chief of
Staff and you all know that we want somebody who can really command, go to the
ground every time and see that the Officers and the troops are doing the right
thing. That is what I would like to add to what I said before but I think the
nomenclature should remain.
Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: I will object
completely to that last one. We started by agreeing that nobody can effectively
command the entire Army. Any attempt to put somebody and say he commands the
entire Army is 'eyewash' it does not work, not in the present circumstances.
Therefore, we must accept that the Army would be Regionalised whether we like
the name or not we all understand what we mean by that. I do not think what we
need at the moment is Supreme Commander because Supreme Commander does involve
commanding. I think what you need is a Commander-in- Chief who is just titular
so that people will take orders from people, at least, they have confidence in.
Whoever you put in Lagos, I say this, will not command the loyalty of the East
if that person is not acceptable to the East, this is the fact of to-day. So
many things have happened and we do no longer trust each other.
Lt.-Col. Hassan: This is taking us
back on the whole issue of Nigerian history....
Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: I said there
should be a co-ordinating group to which each Region would send somebody but
just for the facade of Nigeria there should be a titular Commander-in- Chief
not a Supreme Commander which involves and which means somebody who commands
over and above the various entities. Perhaps after we have created and
generated certain confidence we could again have a Supreme Commander but it is
not feasible to-day this is w hat I am saying.
Lt.-Col. Hassan: With respect, to
summarise the whole thing the Eastern Region will not recognise whoever is the
Supreme Commander in the form of association we are now in and it means a
repetition of the whole history of Nigeria when the politicians were there, to
strive to put either a Northerner or an Easterner at the top. It must be an
Easterner for the Easterners to believe or a Northerner for the Northerners to
believe. To summarise, the Eastern people will not recognise anybody in Lagos
unless he is an Easterner.
Col. Adebayo: I do not think we
should put it that way.
Mr. T. Omo-Bare: I would like to
make a statement. I would like to request with respect that we adjourn to
private session and iron out this matter because there is a lot involved in it.
We cannot sit here on this round table and divide Nigeria because the talks are
moving towards Regionalisation of everything and I do not think it is safe and
we are right to divide Nigeria up on this table. If we retire into private
session we might be able to thrash it out there. We will be able to say
everything in our minds and then come back with a Resolution.
Lt.-Col. Gowon: If that is agreed
we can retire then.
"Meeting Nigerian Military Leaders Held Peduase Lodge, Aburi,
Ghana, 4th 5th January, 1967" by The Federal Republic of Nigeria.
Published by Federal Ministry of Information (1967).
"Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria January 1966-July 1967 (Vol.
1)" by A. H. M. Kirk-Green. Published by Oxford University Press (1971).
