I was alerted to the publication of this book about France’s premier foreign intelligence agency, the DGSE (Direction générale de la sécurité extérieure), after stumbling upon an interview with the author at a YouTube channel concerned with spying and terrorism. The book claims to trace “the agency's history from its early failures to its sweeping reforms and modern-day successes”. But given the brevity of the interview and the “concise history” of the book, I wonder how much of the book covers the homicidal history of its organisational ancestor, the SDECE (Service de documentation extérieure et de contre-espionnage), and, given the author’s mentioning of the DGSE’s role in blaming the Assad government for chemical attacks during the conflict in Syria, the extent to which France’s involvement in what was a “dirty war” is considered a success.
The DGSE traces its roots back to the Second World War with the creation in 1940 of the BCRA (Bureau Central de Renseignements et d'Action) in London. Its objective was to gather intelligence and coordinate the French Resistance. It was after two evolutions, first as the DGSS (Direction Générale des Services Spéciaux), 1943, and then as the DGER (Direction Générale des Études et Recherches), late 1944) that the SDECE was formed in 1947.
This was the same year that the U.S. National Security Act created the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) which fully replaced the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) that had been disbanded in 1945. An interim group named the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) had been established by President Harry Truman in 1946.
It is interesting to note that while the National Security Act did not explicitly provide the CIA with a paramilitary or covert action component, the SDECE merged components of existing military and civilian intelligence bodies. This meant that it would be charged not only with intelligence gathering duties but was legally enabled to use forceful means to attain its objectives.
Thus, the history of the SDECE is replete with involvement in the physical elimination of those designated as enemies of France. One of its victims was Felix-Roland Moumie, the Cameroonian anti-colonial revolutionary, who was assassinated in Geneva in 1960 by William Bechtel. Posing as a journalist, Bechtel poisoned Moumie with a lethal dose of thallium during dinner. Evidence gathered by the Swiss police and the issuance of an international arrest warrant did not lead to his extradition to face trial for murder. Bechtel died in Paris in 1988.
The SDECE also created "La Main Rouge", a covert paramilitary organisation which assassinated Algerian nationalists associated with the FLN (Front de libération nationale) and West German arms dealers who supplied the FLN with weapons during la guerre d'Algérie.
An offshoot of that war was creation of the OAS -organisation de l’armee secrete- after the failed putsch des genereaux of April 1961. The OAS sought to keep Algeria French, an objective they believed would be accomplished by assassinating President Charles de Gaulle. The SDECE’s elite paramilitary unit, Service Action, had been active during the Algerian war and its efforts were later directed at the OAS.
A turning point for the SDECE came in 1965 when it was discovered to have been involved in the kidnapping and disappearance of the Moroccan dissident Mehdi Ben Barka in Paris. The remarkable level of operational freedom it had developed was curtailed by subordinating it to the Ministry of Defence.
However, the level of state control came into question in the light of what came to be known as the Markovic Affair. Stevan Markovic, the Yugoslav-born associate of film star Alain Delon whose corpse was found in a garbage dump in the outskirts of Paris in October 1968. A salacious aspect to the scandal was a claim that Markovic had organised sex parties for the French elite and filmed them.
Rumours spread that one of those who engaged in these orgies was Claude Pompidou, the wife of Georges Pompidou who had served as de Gaulle’s Prime Minister between 1962 and 1968. Pompidou was the front-runner to succeed de Gaulle as president, and it is claimed that the rumours were spread by rogue elements within the SDECE who were bent on revenge for what they perceived to have been his clampdown on the SDECE after the Ben Barka Affair.
The plot to derail Pompidou’s bid for the presidency ultimately failed as he was elected as President in June 1969. Pompidou appointed Alexandre de Marenches to the role of director of the SDECE. The ex-army colonel was tasked to reform and purge it of corrupt and criminal elements. The idea was to steer the organisation away from its predilection for political meddling and state sanctioned executions into one dedicated to intelligence gathering, geopolitical analysis and counterespionage.
It would be interesting to know how many pages van Puyvelde devotes to this torrid history in opening chapter “Foundations”.
The SDECE was formally transformed into the DGSE by the administration of President Francois Mitterrand in April 1982. But this “fresh start” did not eradicate the old ways of dealing with those who presented a nuisance to the interests of the French state.
In October 1983, a suicide truck bombing of a barracks housing French military personnel on peacekeeping duties in Beirut took the lives of 58 French paratroopers. Service Action decided to take a retaliatory measure against Iran, the sponsors of the Lebanese Shia actors who were responsible for the bombing. A jeep packed with 1,100 pounds of explosives was parked outside of the Iranian embassy in Beirut.
However, the suspicious embassy guards caused the French operatives to abandon the vehicle, although soon afterwards, they fired a rocket from 100 yards in a failed attempt to detonate it. The incident harked back to the earlier uncompromisingly violent missions undertaken by Service Action during the SDECE “wars” against the FLN and OAS during the Algerian crisis. The Iranians identified France as the instigators of the attempted bombing and the head of Service Action was subsequently removed from his position.
But worse was to come.
In July 1985,while in pursuance of what was codenamed “Operation Satanique”, agents of the DGSE blew up of the Rainbow Warrior, a Greenpeace-owned sea vessel which had been protesting French nuclear tests in the South Pacific. A photographer who was covering the protest died. Feigning ignorance, President Mitterrand dismissed the DGSE’s director-general Admiral Pierre Lacoste, although Lacoste would later state that he had been given explicit permission to carry out the attack by Mitterrand himself.
This was a low point for the DGSE which could count the extradition back to France of Klaus Barbie - the “Butcher of Lyon”- as one of its early successes.
The profound and rewarding reforms of the DGSE to which Van Puyvelde emphasises came after the appointment on March 23rd, 1989, of Claude Silberzahn as the organisation’s director-general. Mitterrand broke with the longstanding tradition of appointing military officers by opting for a career civil servant whom Van Puyvelde attributes as bringing “stability and modernisation” to France’s approach to external intelligence.
One major focus of this change in approach which the author appraises as having been successful was French intelligence’s contrary position to those of the United States and Britain on the question of whether Saddam Hussein’s Iraq was in possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction. While Richard Dearlove, the Head of MI6 -the British equivalent of the DGSE- privately admitted to his Prime Minister that the evidence of weapons of mass destruction was “thin” but told him that this would be no problem because “intelligence and facts were being fixed (by the US) around the policy”, the DGSE advised President Jaques Chirac that no concrete evidence confirmed their existence. Chirac refused to participate in the military action, a move that was subsequently vindicated.
But while the refusal to go along with the Anglo-Saxon powers may have brought back memories of French independent action during the era of de Gaulle, events would later develop to the point where France and its intelligence service would fall in line with the geopolitical agenda set by the United States. A key step in this direction came in March of 2009 when President Nicolas Sarkozy reintegrated France into NATO’s military command structure, a reversal of de Gaulle’s decision to withdraw from it in 1966.
While Van Puyvelde appears to argue that the DGSE’s focus on anti-terrorism since the 1990s has been successful, the evidence indicates that this is strictly not the case.
Consider for instance the action taken by NATO in Libya against the government of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi. Early suspicions that this had been initiated by France were confirmed through subsequently released public records and parliamentary investigations which were undertaken after his overthrow.
There is evidence that the warnings provided by the DGSE to France’s political and military leadership of the consequent chaos that would inevitably ensue in the event of Gaddafi’s removal went unheeded. Far from stifling terrorism, Libya’s destruction led to the empowerment of terrorist actors in the service of the West. The destruction of Libya, then a secular state, while NATO effectively served as the air force of militias such as the al-Qaeda-orientated Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) was hugely ironic given its effect of enabling the spread of Salafist insurgent groups in the Maghreb, the Sahelian region and the Lake Chad Basin.
The ineffectiveness of “Operation Barkhane”, the anti-jihadist counterinsurgency conducted across the Sahel in cooperation with various states, was one of the key reasons given by those Sahelian states whose military regimes have expelled the French military as part of the wider agenda of breaking out of France’s shadow empire in Francophone Africa.
So far as the DGSE's role in Syria is concerned, Van Puyvelde references the DGSE’s exfiltration of a range of sample materials from the scene of a chemical attack allegedly carried out by the then Syrian state. But the claim that the Ba'athist government utilised chemical warfare against its own people is highly contested by journalists in the independent media.
Also contested is the framing by the Western mainstream media of the Syrian conflict as a product of the so-called “Arab Spring”. Far from being a grass roots rebellion by a groundswell of people wishing to overthrow a dictator to make way for a new democratic order, the Syria “dirty war” was in fact, as Roland Dumas, a former foreign minister of France, revealed in 2013 “prepared, conceived and organized” at least two years in advance of what became an insurgency.
And this insurgency, a concerted effort by the United States and its regional allies -The Gulf monarchies, Turkey and Israel- to overthrow Ba’athist Syria, was undertaken with home grown and imported Sunni Islamists bearing the ideology of al Qaeda.
Foreign intelligence agencies work towards promoting the interests of their countries, but they must work within the parameters of national foreign policy as set by their governments.
De Gaulle set out France’s traditional interests with great clarity. His words and actions indicated that France could not be a truly sovereign state if it was integrated into NATO’s military command structure. He acknowledged Russia -the word he used to describe the Soviet Union- as a civilisational state with which it was important to dialogue with and develop trade.
Again, it is difficult to see how he, unlike France’s contemporary political leaders, would have constrained French sovereignty by going along with the American project of seeking to destroy Russia and dismember it to control its natural resources. De Gaulle considered Red China, as he did Soviet Russia, to be a civilisational entity in relation to which France needed to deal with realistic pragmatism and not in the adversarial manner by which the United States and the collective EU insist it be treated.
The usefulness of the DGSE is thus constricted if the unique interests of state which it serves are undermined by the allegiance of France’s political leaders to an American-dominated supra-national military structure and to geopolitical policies which are geared toward preserving U.S. global hegemony, and in West Asia, U.S. insistence on the primacy of the interests of the State of Israel.
Interestingly, Van Puyvelde states that the DGSE maintains a mysterious level of cooperation with its Chinese counterparts, which apparently has managed to turn a number of DGSE officers over the years. That failing aside, it is perhaps a useful reminder of Reinhard Gehlen’s words that it “is the duty of every sophisticated intelligence service to keep open a channel of communication with the enemy”. Foreign intelligence agencies can be useful tools in repairing and promoting relations between ostensibly hostile nations. They offer a channel through which back-channel diplomacy may be conducted and they can cooperate when facing common threats.
This, arguably, should be the most important role the DGSE should play in the present circumstances during which the French political class, has willingly gone along with the post-Cold War American policy -encapsulated in the so-called Wolfowitz Doctrine- of seeking to prevent the rise of a global competitor capable of filling the vacuum left by the withered Soviet Union.
The resultant anti-Russian and anti-China agenda has only succeeded in uniting the Eurasian landmass leaving Europe, including the French, more dependent on the declining U.S. empire and delimiting the French foreign intelligence service to a role which includes aiding a Ukrainian proxy tasked with weakening Russia and indirectly supporting Islamist terror proxies including the militia which has taken power in Syria after the fall of the Assad government in 2024.
© Adeyinka Makinde (2026).
Adeyinka Makinde is a writer based in London, England.
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