Commander James Rawe and the crew of NNS
Penelope during the amphibious operation in Bonny. Photo credit:
Archive of Captain James Rawe.
Abstract:
The amphibious landing of troops belonging to
the federal army of Nigeria at Bonny during the Nigerian Civil War is often
described as a landmark feat accomplished by the military of a modern Black African
state. It was the first of a total of five seaborne landings undertaken during
the conflict which along with the instituting of a naval blockade formed the
basis of the encirclement and eventual defeat of the secessionist state of
Biafra. This paper captures the rapid transformation of the Nigerian Navy from what
many may have perceived as a glorified civilian marine department into a
battle-ready force which asserted itself during the tumultuous period of bloody
divisions in the army before going on to orchestrate the first of a series of
combined operations during which it successfully transported, landed, and
afforded covering fire to troops of the Third Infantry Division. In elucidating
on the anatomy of an amphibious operation, the paper will explain the wider
implications of the endeavour in terms of its military and political
objectives. It also reveals the pivotal role played by James Rawe, an
expatriate British naval officer and veteran of the Normandy landings, in the planning
and execution of what would become Naval Operation (No.1) of 1967.
The background
The Nigerian Navy was barely a decade old when
it was called upon to perform the first amphibious landing of troops by a
modern Black African armed force in July 1967. Nigeria did not have a maritime
organisation dedicated to warfare until 1956.1 Although Nigeria’s 850-mile-long coastline lay
adjacent to the strategically important sea lanes within the Gulf of Guinea,2 its British colonial
ruler preferred the Royal Navy to provide an umbrella of military protection
while it operated a civilian-orientated Marine Department for the country. The
Marine Department of the Niger Coast Company which was formed in 1894 was
succeeded in 1914 by a Marine Department which consisted of the merged Marine
Departments of the Northern and Southern Protectorates.3 As independence dawned, pressure from segments
of the native political class to create a conventional navy grew. Therefore the
creation of the Nigerian Naval Force, was an effort to establish an armed
institution dedicated to protecting the soon-to-be independent nation’s
littoral borders from external aggression, along with miscellaneous duties including deterring and
apprehending those involved in smuggling.4 The body was renamed the Royal Nigerian Navy in 19595 and it finally became the
Nigerian Navy in 1963 after the country became a republic.6
Providing an overview of the Nigerian Navy
during the period of crisis which commenced in 1966 and the organisation’s
reaction to events is important for two reasons. First, the navy responded by
embarking on a remarkably rapid transformation into a state of military
preparedness. Secondly, while it had evaded the violent divisions which had
ripped through the Nigerian Army, it would nonetheless endure episodes of
sabotage, as well as the defection of personnel. The latter element left the
leader of the secessionist region firmly convinced that the navy’s capacities
had been neutralised to the extent that it was not expected to play a prominent
role in the overall effort of the federal government in attempting to crush the
rebellion.
Unlike the Nigerian Army whose predecessors
had accumulated a good deal of experience in campaigns in various parts of the
African continent and as far as Burma, the Nigerian Navy had no such tradition
of campaigning save that of the limited activity of the old Marine Department
against German Kamerun forces during the Great War fought by the European
powers.7 And unlike
the army, the Nigerian Navy was not required to perform peacekeeping duties
during the upheavals in the Congo in the early 1960s.
A coup led by middle-ranking officers of the
army in January 1966 was followed in July by a reprisal coup which caused even
greater bloodshed than the first. During these upheavals, the navy remained a
stable organisation under the leadership of Commodore Joseph Wey, the marine
engineer who had become the first indigenous Chief of Naval Staff in 1964. Under
Wey, the navy participated in the efforts aimed at stabilising the country and
providing legitimacy to the two military governments which were formed in 1966.
Commodore Wey also attended the peace talks held under the auspices of the
Ghanaian government in the town of Aburi in January 1967.8
The image of the navy as a glorified marine
department began to change after it was put on alert as a reaction to the
January 15th coup. For the first time, members of the public saw
naval officers carrying service pistols and ratings wearing blue-shirted combat
uniforms and steel helmets while armed with L1A1 Self-Loading Rifles. Armed
naval ratings formed part of the defensive ring around the old Parliament
building inside which Commodore Wey appeared alongside Major General Johnson
Aguiyi-Ironsi, the head of the newly formed military government. Behind Wey was
his aide-de-camp, a sub-lieutenant whose right hand appeared much of the time
to be positioned above his gun-holster.9
The tense situation necessitated the
imposition of emergency naval base defences at Apapa. In January, the navy
asserted itself by refusing to hand over army coup suspects being held as
prisoners at the base to army officers until this was done through the correct
channels. The army provost marshal who had arrived with an escort of soldiers
was first made to walk past a set of 20mm Oerlikon cannon and Vickers machine
guns before continuing through layers of seamen who were armed with rifles and
submachine guns. Ratings were also armed and dug in at various sectors of the
base. Similarly, after the July coup, a request made by army officers to search
the base for weapons was resolutely refused. It is worth noting that the navy
provided shelter to senior army officers and the Inspector General of Police at
the base. Coffins for two of the prominent officials assassinated in January
1966 were also prepared at the base and the navy oversaw the transporting of
the body of the fallen Supreme Commander to his hometown in the Eastern region
in January 1967 where Commodore Wey attended the funeral.10
During the crisis, naval personnel from all
regions continued to serve side-by-side but there was an unavoidable uneasiness
given the prevailing circumstances in the country. The drift towards an
internal war and the fear that naval force would be used in such a war if it
was waged against the Eastern region led to acts of sabotage. In April 1967,
the base was plunged into darkness by a power cut. This was followed by the
vandalising of electronic equipment on board many of the navy’s vessels. These
included navigational aids and communication apparatus. Armaments, gunfire pins,
communication sets, and engine parts were either totally removed or disabled.
In the meantime there were defections of officers and men to the Eastern region
before its secession on May 30th,1967 under the leadership of Lieutenant
Colonel Emeka Ojukwu.11
The build-up to the first amphibious landing
was preceded by important military tasks which were undertaken by the navy.
Prior to the declaration by the Federal Government of a “police action” on July
6th, 1967, the promulgation of the Territorial Waters Decree (No.5) of 1967
which extended the limit of Nigeria’s territorial sea from the customary 3
nautical miles to 12 nautical miles paved the way for the navy to mount an
economic blockade against the seceded eastern region.12 The objective was to blockade the littoral
space where oil was exported with the prime targets being the
harbours in Port Harcourt and Bonny.
The strategic dimension of this blockade was
to prevent arms being smuggled into the secessionist state and the economic
dimension related to stopping international trade with the former Eastern
region. From the early part of July, no ships were allowed to be loaded at any
ports including the oil terminal and the Federal Military Government warned oil
companies against paying royalties into a suspense account when royalties
became due in July. If they persisted in doing so, the government informed them
that the Nigerian Navy would be used to prevent the departure of any tanker.13
The next step was to mount an amphibious
landing of Federal troops, a move that would be orchestrated by the Nigerian
Navy. Commodore Wey was handed a list of possible sites by Major General Yakubu
Gowon, the head of the Federal Military Government.14
The authors Ian Speller and Christopher Tuck
define amphibious warfare as:
A
type of offensive military operation that today uses naval ships to project
ground and air power onto a hostile or potentially hostile shore at a
designated landing beach.15
Amphibious operations are traditionally
classified into four types namely the “amphibious assault,” “amphibious
withdrawal,” “amphibious demonstration” and an “amphibious raid". A fifth,
namely that of “amphibious support" is often added these days.16
The operation at Bonny was designed and
executed as an amphibious assault. It was not an exploratory exercise solely
intended to inflict damage on the enemy, collect information or otherwise
create a diversion as is the objective of a “raid.” It was also not an
amphibious “demonstration,” that is, a deception designed to divert attention
from other landing sites. Nor was it a mission designed to offer "support on the basis of providing humanitarian aid or disaster relief or a “withdrawal,”
which is an operation designed to extract forces from a hostile shore.17
Orchestrating a landing that is not opposed is
an inherently difficult endeavour, it is not surprising therefore that
conducting an amphibious operation where the enemy is waiting is considered to
be among the most onerous and dangerous military operations.
The conventional pattern of an amphibious
assault would be to begin by bombarding the defensive positions of the enemy,
which in the Nigerian case would be limited to naval bombardment. Once the
opposition is “softened,” troops will be taken to the shore on transport
vessels and landing craft in successive waves during which time beachheads are
seized and a perimeter established to enable the introduction of heavy
reinforcements composed of armaments and vehicles, along with stores. These
accumulated efforts then provide the basis of the landed force advancing inland
and transforming maritime warfare into a land campaign.18
Thus, the idea behind the Bonny operation was
for a Nigerian naval task force to land and establish soldiers of the newly
created Third Infantry Division onto territory held by secessionist forces and
begin the effort of regaining territory.
It is important to emphasise the point that
Nigeria was a young nation which had not developed any substantive naval
traditions in the modern sense. It did not have what might be described as a
“military intellectual complex” from which to draw from decades or even
centuries of tried and tested naval operational concepts. The Nigerian Navy had
its small but increasing naval warfare personnel trained at foreign
institutions most notably at the Britannia Naval College in Dartmouth, England
but it lacked relevant indigenous institutions including that of a Naval War
College and specialist departments in higher education organisations where the
built-up intellectual resources of naval and civilian thinkers composed of
analysts, strategists and senior officers would have laid down the theoretical
foundations of Nigerian sea power.19
And even though it could be argued that
national military doctrines would be focused on combating external threats
rather than on an internal war, the fact remained that the Nigerian Navy had no
experience whatsoever in planning and implementing a seaborne landing
operation.
Those operations which had taken place on the
African continent had been conducted by European and North American militaries.
“Operation Menace” in September 1940 was an attack jointly mounted by Free
French and British naval forces on Vichy-held Dakar, Senegal,20 while “Operation
Ironclad”, the first British amphibious assault since the disastrous landings
at the Dardanelles in February 1915, was an Allied attack on Vichy-held
Malagasy which was staged in May 1942.21 And in November 1942, “Operation Torch” was the Allied
attack on French Morocco and French Algeria where German and Italian armies
were in control.22
Although the possibility had existed prior to
the Bonny assault of an inter-service operation of the Nigerian armed forces:
one over political tension with Cameroon23 and another relating to a planned invasion of Togo to aid
President Sylvanus Olympio in the event of a war with Nkrumaist Ghana, the
Nigerian Navy and Army had never performed a combined operation.24
Apart from its deficiency in the
aforementioned “military intellectual complex,” the Nigerian Navy did not have
an Indigenous “military industrial complex” from which it produced its own
weapons including naval ships.25
The reliance on foreign manufacturers and suppliers would be an issue which
would hover over the navy for the duration of the war.
The starting point for any exploration of how
the Bonny Landing was conceptualised and put into effect must be with the
figure of Commander James Rawe who at the time of the crisis was serving as
Principal Staff Officer and Commander of the Naval Base in Apapa.26 The son of a linguist in
the service of British naval intelligence and grandson of a naval architect who
became the superintendent of the Ottoman Sultan’s arsenal, Rawe was a veteran
of the Second World War when as a teenaged midshipman of the Royal Navy
Volunteer Reserve (RNVR), he served as the navigation
officer of a landing craft and had landed the first wave of American troops on D-day
at “Utah Beach”.27
As the only officer
serving in the Nigerian Navy who had faced gunfire while landing on a beach it
was quite obvious that his knowledge and experience would be central to the
planning and execution of the forthcoming operation. The other handy bit
of experience brought to the table by Rawe was that of his role as a hydrographer.
His long-term experience of surveying the coastline of Nigeria including the
rivers and creeks of the Niger Delta would be crucial because he came to know
the coastal area better than any of his navigator colleagues.28
Thus, he became the author of what would be
known as Naval Operation (Order Number 1) of 1967 and the subsequent
operational orders. Also, in conjunction with the newly promoted Rear Admiral
Wey, he formulated an overall naval strategy.29
Rawe went on to produce a paper which he
divided into three segments. First, he outlined some general points related to
the nature of seaborne operations. Secondly, he scrutinised the viability of
three potential landing sites prior to offering a justification of his choice
as the most suitable one, and finally he assessed the capacities of the naval
and merchant vessels which would be available to carry out a landing.30
The preparation
The first segment of the top-secret paper
produced by Rawe which was titled “General information and remarks on landings”
focused on pre-landing operations, which would in modern parlance be described
as “shaping the littoral battlespace.” He outlined the necessity of having
intelligence on the physical terrain of the proposed landing site and the
resistance that was likely to be met. Among other considerations, he emphasised
the absolute necessity of degrading any prepared enemy positions and examined
the methods which would be employed in the battlefield. The weaponry and
manpower available to both adversaries were also considered. Finally, he looked
at failures in a select number of amphibious operations undertaken by combined
forces during the Second World War.31
An essential component part of the preparation
of an amphibious assault is the gathering of intelligence data. The Nigerian
Navy alongside the army needed in the first instance to gather clear and
reliable intelligence on the physical geography of the area which would
eventually function as a landing site, as well as on the concentrations of
enemy forces in the vicinity of the targeted area.32
As far as physical geography is concerned, one
vital piece of information commanders need to be fully informed of should be
the nature of the beach. From this, they will be able to assess whether
vehicles will be able to move over it, as well as the chances of the landing
craft being damaged. Factors which need to be considered include the gradient
of the beach and any natural and man-made obstructions on such a beach.
Knowledge of the gradient of the beach allows commanders to assess the depth of
water through which men and vehicles would have to wade through before reaching
the shore. They will also need to be aware of any potential obstructions, such
as the presence of a seawall or steep-rising land, either of which would be an
encumbrance to landing equipment and enabling troops to break out from the
beach.33
Of particular concern to the naval command,
Rawe noted the importance of having knowledge of the tidal stream and the
amount of rise and fall of tide. This would then determine the angle of
approach which the landing craft would make to the beach and the length of time
that the craft would be able to remain on the beach without being stranded.
Another issue of concern to the navy would be the sea conditions. In other
words, they needed to have an idea of the level of surf or volatility of waves
once the landing craft had beached.34
The second major issue, namely that of dealing
with enemy concentrations around the designated area of beaching, was of
particular concern to Rawe who stressed the need for enemy positions to be sufficiently
weakened by initial bombardment. In the case of a first landing, the Nigerian
Navy would have to accomplish this without the assistance of an air force.35
The navy would of course be responsible for
getting troops of the Third Infantry Division onto land. The best method to
begin the enterprise would be to first send a small craft “carrying few men and
offering small targets.” Once the beach is made secure, the larger landing
craft would be brought in to build up the landing force. The navy would be
intimately involved in the method of supplying the force once it is landed and
facilitating the transporting of vehicles, stores, and equipment from the point
at which the craft beaches to firm land.36
Rawe’s paper assessed the relative strengths
of both federal and secessionist forces and noted that while the enemy was
limited in terms of the weaponry it would bring to the arena of battle, the
Nigerian forces were also limited. For one, the navy did not possess any small
landing craft; dinghies would provide a substitute of sorts, and it only
possessed one landing craft tank. The stakes were high. For as Rawe noted, if
Nigeria’s sole landing craft were damaged before landing the first wave of
troops, there could be no landing. Furthermore, if the landing craft was
damaged after landing the first troops but before a jetty was captured, where
ordinary vessels could berth, then the troops on shore would be unable to be
reinforced or be supplied with additional stores.37
Rawe was able to offer practical insight into
the question of landings given his experiences during World War 2, offering
three painful lessons the Allied forces endured. As far as the prior knowledge
of physical geography of the selected landing site was concerned,
he offered the examples of the amphibious operations conducted at Dieppe in
1942 and at Omaha Beach in 1944. Dieppe, an operation that was overseen by
Admiral Louis Mountbatten, failed because no account had been taken during the
planning of the seawall which prevented tanks and other vehicles from leaving
the beach. The element of surprise was lost. In the case of the landing at
Omaha Beach, American forces found themselves unable to break out from the
beach area because the terrain behind the beach consisted of steep cliffs.38
The failure of the amphibious raid at Dieppe
and the near failure of the landing at Omaha Beach were also due to the failure
to degrade enemy positions by bombardment. This was also at the heart of the
costly loss of life among Royal Navy personnel during the operation to capture
the Belgian region of Walcheren, which controls access to the seaport of Antwerp.
Sorties carried out by the Royal Air Force and Royal Navy bombardment did not
successfully neutralise several potent German batteries one of which scored a
direct hit on a landing craft which killed around 300 allied personnel. This
incident had a profound effect on the young James Rawe who knew many of the
naval officers who took part in the operation and several friends of his died.
Although he did not participate in the operation as he had at Normandy, he
learned lessons from the mistakes made by the operation commanders, one of
which was relying too much on the element of surprise.39
The city of Port Harcourt was a strategically
important town which featured high on the list of possible candidates. Its
harbour facilities as well as its connection with Nigeria’s then burgeoning oil
production marked it out. It was of critical importance that it come under
Federal control as soon as possible to prevent the secessionist state from
conducting a lucrative international trade which would economically empower it
and therefore enable it to build up a more formidable arsenal.40
But Port Harcourt was over 40 miles up from
the Bonny fairway buoy, and it would take between 4 to 6 hours to get there,
depending on the tide, after entering the Bonny River. The task force would
surely be sighted which would give the enemy plenty of opportunity to prepare
defensive positions. Moreover, the approach to Port Harcourt for the last 20
miles becomes narrow which would enable the opposition, if armed with mortars
or rocket-propelled short-range weapons, to inflict heavy damage on the convoy.
Even if the naval force successfully beached, the civilian vessels would make
for large easy targets and the supply chain of ships would have to take
enormous risks during a 40-mile journey until the banks of the Bonny River were
cleared of the enemy.41
“From a naval point of view,” Rawe concluded,
“to embark on an attack on Port Harcourt, direct, would invite disaster.”42
Opobo ostensibly presented a more promising
location. There were suitable locations to beach and there was sufficient depth
of water to enable vessels to manoeuvre once vessels passed the bar. However,
there were difficulties, the most critical of which was the river bar. There
was great uncertainty about the depth of the waters in this area. The river was
not used commercially and the last survey which had been done in 1961 recorded
a depth of seven feet. The lack of water on the bar would mean that only the
landing craft would be able to enter the river and that the landing would have
to take place without naval fire support.43
Adding to the potential problems was the
question of weather conditions. River bars are vulnerable to the effects of
heavy rain, fierce winds and crashing waves. If the weather was bad in the
Opobo area, it would mean that even the navy’s landing craft would be unable to
enter the river. It would be too much to risk the only landing craft ending up
stranded on one of the sand spits on either side of the river channel. Still
another impediment was the lack of intelligence on the presence and visibility
of marker buoys and the beacon. The marker buoys would of course enable the
task force to negotiate the navigable parts of the river, while the beacon
would aid the ships in fixing their positions prior to entering the river.44
The elimination of Port Harcourt and Opobo
left Bonny as the only site where from “a naval point of view,” as Commander
Rawe put it, “a landing would have a fair chance of success.” It ticked most of
the boxes. The water was deep all the way up to the town; the wideness of the
river would give ships room for manoeuvre; there were several spots which were
suitable for the landing craft to beach; there were jetties at which ships
could berth and supply stores even if the landing craft was disabled; naval
vessels would be able to provide fire support to the troops being landed; and
enemy vessels intending to bring reinforcements down the river would be
stopped. Additionally, occupying Bonny would seal off Port Harcourt 40 miles up
the river and landing on an island and taking it had the added advantage of an
island being easier to defend than an area of mainland.45
A successful landing and the subsequent capture
of Bonny would, Rawe noted, yield great benefits for the federal war effort.
Firstly, it would release the navy from blockade duty off Bonny River and allow
it to concentrate on other areas. Secondly, the navy would have an area close
to the base of operations and would be in a better position to support the
army. Thirdly, military forces could be built for an advance on Port Harcourt.46
There was also the obvious political and economic importance of capturing Bonny Town and the adjacent oil terminal.
Shell-BP was still mulling over whether to pay the secessionist state
royalties. Capturing Bonny would make it quite clear to Shell BP that it was
Federal Nigeria that would control the export of oil.47
The third and final section of Rawe’s paper
set out the vessels which were available to serve as a task force.
None of the vessels, naval or merchant, had
been built in the country, the result of Nigeria having not developed an
industrial base. The Nigerian Navy owned ships which had once been in the
service of the navies of the United States or Western European countries such
as Britain, the Netherlands, Germany, and France. The lack of a manufacturing
base invites the dangers associated with over reliance on foreign suppliers, as
well as with the costs associated with maintenance.48
Still, the Navy had more vessels at its
disposal than the secessionist side which had acquired NNS Ibadan, a
minesweeper which had been on patrol off the Eastern region during the crisis. Arrayed
against that sole vessel would be a frigate, a patrol boat, three seaward
defence boats (SDBs) and one landing craft. Although he did not include it
among “available vessels,” NNS Penelope, Rawe’s old survey ship, was
converted into a fighting vessel. Merchant ships would also be available to
serve as troop carriers and to transport stores.49
NNS Nigeria, a Dutch-made frigate, was 314 feet in length
and had a maximum speed of 24 knots. It had one set of twin MK XVI “HA/LA”
naval guns which were quick firing and used by the Royal Navy and other
Commonwealth navies. It also had 4 Bofors anti-aircraft guns. NNS Ogoja was a U.S.-made patrol boat which was gifted to the
Netherlands by President Franklin D. Roosevelt during the Second World War. It
was a 185-foot-long corvette armed with a 3-inch gun, four 40mm Bofors guns and
six 4mm Oerlikons and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) equipment. It had a maximum
speed of 18 knots.50
The Nigerian Navy also had three seaward
defence boats namely NNS Enugu, NNS Benin, and NNS Kaduna, all 110-foot long and armed with one 40mm Bofors and
anti-submarine equipment. Each had a speed of 13 knots. The landing craft NNS Lokoja was 188-foot in length and had two 20mm Oerlikons. It had a
speed of 8 knots. NNS Penelope was a 79-foot-long survey
vessel which was converted into an armed ship possessing one 20mm Oerlikon and
two Vickers machine guns. They would be accompanied by two merchant ships named
MV Bode Thomas and the MV King Jaja.51
After considering all the issues of the three
sections it was up to the Federal Military Government to determine whether, as
Rawe put it, the information and assessment “are such that the military
necessity of the landings outweigh the risks involved.”52
The decision to stage the landing in Bonny was
soon confirmed and Commander Rawe drew up a mission plan which specified the
role to be played by the Commanding Officer of each ship from the moment they
were issued with sailing orders to the landing operation. Command
responsibilities were clearly delineated and issues such as communication
procedures, logistics, medical and tidal information were dealt with.53
The preamble to Naval Operation Order Number
One of 1967 was succinct and straightforward.
The situation was that the Bonny Town area was
“occupied by enemy forces approximately 300 strong in prepared positions,” and
the mission was to “transport, land and afford the support of naval fire power
to federal troops, in order to facilitate the capture of Bonny Town and the
island”.54
The three seniormost commanders of the mission
were identified as Captain Nelson Soroh, Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin Adekunle
and Commander James Rawe. Soroh was designated as the “officer-in-charge” of
the operation, Adekunle, the General Officer
Commanding the Third Infantry Division was the “officer commanding land forces,”
and Rawe was given the roles of “naval liaison
officer” and “forward control officer.”55
Soroh, the officer in charge of the mission,
had like Rear Admiral Wey been transferred from the Marine Department to the
Royal Nigerian Navy where he became a pioneer naval warfare officer. He had commanded
several ships including NNS Nigeria and was earmarked as the eventual
successor to Wey as the Chief of Naval Staff. Trained in England at Mons
Officer Cadet School and at the prestigious Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst,
Adekunle had on the eve of war been a commander at the small Lagos Garrison
Organisation. But the onset of war meant that he had to build two battalions
into the size of a division which would be assigned the formidable task of
attacking the secessionist state large via the route of seaborne landings.56
Rawe’s plan provided for the task force to
land troops in three waves. The first wave would consist of troops on the
landing craft NNS Lokoja which would beach on the
northern part of Bonny Town. The second wave of troops would be landed by NNS Nigeria when the situation permitted. And the third wave would be
landed after Bonny Town was captured.57
The timeline regarding the commanding of the
operation was that during the seaborne assault, the officer-in-charge of the
mission, namely Captain Soroh, the Commanding Officer of NNS Nigeria, would exercise control through
the forward control officer, Commander Rawe, the Commanding Officer of NNS
Penelope. Rawe would lead the
task force into battle while NNS Nigeria, a prized asset which the navy
would not place in unnecessary risk in shallower and more confined waters would
bombard enemy placements within Bonny.58 In doing this, Rawe was adhering to the naval maxim cautioning
against risking big ships for which the protagonist will not get an equivalent
amount of military value.59
Only when the enemy positions covering the
Bonny River were silenced would Nigeria enter the river and command be
transferred from the Forward Control Officer to the Officer in Charge of the
Operation. After completing the landing operations, sea and land commands would
then divide.60
Apart from Soroh and Rawe, the other
commanders of the vessels taking part in the mission were designated as
Commander Apayi Joe, NNS Lokoja; Lt. Commander Akin Aduwo, NNS Ogoja;
Lt. Commander Huseni Abdullahi, NNS Enugu; and Lt. Commander Robert
Adegbite, NNS Benin.61
The movement of vessels was also carefully
choreographed for the three different stages of the operation. First was the
initial movement of vessels from Lagos to the theatre of operations. Second was
the movement of vessels to the area of operations and third was the function of
the vessels during the landing operation.62
The movement of vessels from the naval base in
Lagos had to be staggered as each of the types of ships had different
capacities of speed. NNS Lokoja, sailing at a speed of 8 knots,
was scheduled to leave first. It was destined for Escravos but would rendezvous
first with the MV Bode Thomas, a ship of the Nigerian
Ports Authority, at Ogidigben and embark the assault troops. After this it
would sail to meet the main body of the task force at Escravos Fairway Buoy. Penelope sailed after Lokoja moving at 7 knots and would
rendezvous with the task force at Bonny Fairway Buoy. Nigeria, alongside Ogoja,
Enugu and Benin were scheduled to leave very shortly after Penelope at a speed of 12 knots and
scheduled to rendezvous with Lokoja
at Escravos Fairway Buoy. From Escravos, they would proceed to rendezvous with Penelope at Bonny Fairway Buoy.63
After the ships assembled on the Atlantic
Ocean, at the mouth of the Bonny River, the movement of the vessels into the
area of operations would begin. As is the tradition in military planning, Rawe, converting a nautical
chart created by the Nigerian Ports Authority into a theatre of operations map, divided the waters of
the Atlantic Ocean and that of the Bonny River that is adjacent to Bonny Island
into separate designated areas. From south to north the areas were named “Osca,” “Papa,” “Quebec,”
“Romeo,” “Sierra,” “Tango,” “Uniform,” “Victor,” “Whiskey” “X-ray,” “Yankee”
and “Zulu.”64
At the same time, Bonny town was divided into
a number of sectors in which the ship commanders were assigned tasks relating
to shore bombardment. From south to north the sectors were “Mike” (Shell area),
“India,” “Hotel,” “Golf,” “Foxtrot", “Echo,” “Delta", “Bravo” and
“Alpha.”65
In summary the
battleplan was that NNS Ogoja under Lieutenant
Commander Aduwo was scheduled to move northwards into “Area Sierra,” while NNS Enugu and NNS Benin to be commanded respectively by
Lieutenant Commander Abdullahi and Lieutenant Commander Adegbite would advance
further into “Area Tango.” The landing craft NNS Lokoja commanded by Commander Joe and escorted by NNS Benin would then proceed into the next zone designated as “Area
Uniform.” NNS Penelope would operate flexibly with
Commander Rawe communicating orders to the ships and simultaneously apprising NNS Nigeria of the combat situation while Nigeria remained in the southernmost areas in the Atlantic Ocean
respectively named “Area Papa” and “Area Osca.” NNS Nigeria would use
its large guns to bombard enemy positions, with bombardment being supplemented
by those ships carrying Bofors guns. The Oerlikon guns and the Vickers guns
could be used to provide covering fire for advancing federal troops.66
A more detailed rendition of Rawe’s plan was
as follows: Captain Soroh in NNS Nigeria was to remain in either the
“Papa” or “Osca” areas until it was safe for her to enter into the Bonny River.
Its role at the commencement of the operation was to silence any artillery or
gun positions in the theatre of war, waiting for an appropriate moment to enter
the battle zone after the first wave of troops was landed by NNS Lokoja. Soroh had on board ten assault boats, and it would be up to
him to decide whether to use them to disembark the troops who were onboard Nigeria or to transfer them to Joe on Lokoja which was supposed to re-join Nigeria after it disembarked the first
wave.67
During this war flares or star shells were used
as a means of conveying military signals, so Lieutenant Commander Adegbite on NNS Enugu was expected to communicate when the SDBs opened fire to
Soroh by sending up “one green very light.” Rawe, the Forward Control Officer
on Penelope, was to back this up
verbally via radio channel.68
Aduwo on NNS Ogoja was to
remain within “Area Sierra” in order to provide bombardment and cover fire in
“Sector Golf” in Bonny. Ogoja’s task
was to engage enemy troops and prevent them from moving north where the landing
was taking place. It was also expected to engage any enemy troops if they
retreated southwards. In order to avoid casualties caused by “friendly fire,”
Aduwo and other ship commanders were advised of the procedure associated with
indicating the position of friendly troops. The troops of the Third
Division engaging the enemy in Bonny were expected to indicate their position
to naval vessels by firing “one green Very light.” In doing so, the troops
would be indicating their most southerly position which would permit relevant
naval vessels to fire ahead of them. This is because the commanding officers on
the vessels would presume that the troops to the north of the point from where
the Very light was fired were “friendly” and those to the south were “enemy” troops
unless the relevant vessel commander had strong reason to believe otherwise.69
In “Area Tango,” Abdullahi and Adegbite,
respectively on Enugu and Benin were tasked with first firing at
the jetties situated at the northern end of Bonny after which they would
bombard the landing area situated between the two northernmost jetties.
Abdullahi was charged with arranging the bombardment so that the whole target
area was covered. Both commanding officers were under instructions not to fire
from north of their position in “Tango” unless necessary in order to prevent
stray shells from landing in the high-density area of Bonny “Sector Foxtrot.”
Abdullahi had the responsibility for issuing “one green Very light” when firing
commenced and both he and Adegbite were to cease firing on the landing area
once Joe in Lokoja fired “one red
Very light.” Once Enugu and Benin completed their bombardment, they
were to move north into the next zone, “Area Uniform” where they were expected
to engage any enemy vessels or enemy aircraft coming down the Bonny River.70
Lokoja was expected to land
between the two northernmost jetties of Bonny Town with the exact position of
the landing to be decided by Joe. Joe was as mentioned expected to fire one “red
Very light” in the final stage of her beaching run. Throughout all of this,
Rawe in Penelope would function as
the forward control for both sea and land forces until Soroh entered the Bonny
River in Nigeria.71
Rawe reminded all commanding officers that
their ships were to be prepared to defend themselves against air attack and to
post lookouts to give warning of approaching aircraft. They were expected to
engage with any enemy in their vicinity, and where this was not the case, they
were to forward pertinent information to “control,” that is Rawe’s ship. Voice
traffic was to be kept to a minimum and ship captains were reminded not to fire
into the high density “Sector Foxtrot '' unless essential.72
In addressing the issue of logistics, which covered
supplies of ammunition, fuel, and food, Rawe stated that all vessels were to
stock up on their full outfit of ammunition before sailing and to cram in as
much as possible if there was enough stowage space. Each vessel was to be
fuelled to no less than 95% of its capacity and to have enough water which
would be rationed. So far as food was concerned, all vessels were to be stocked
with as much fresh and dry rations as could be stowed. Further, they were
instructed not to leave Lagos with less than seven days rations of food.73
The ships were supposed to have first aid
medical supplies with access to a doctor and other medical personnel on Nigeria. Those wounded who required more
than first aid would be transferred to Nigeria
as soon as it was expeditious. Nigeria would also be carrying additional
personnel for replacement purposes. Tidal information specific to the high
water and lower water estimates regarding both Bonny Bar and Bonny Town was
also given, covering four periods during the day on Monday, July 24th, Tuesday
July 25th and Wednesday, July 26th.74
Finally, Naval Operation (Order No. 1) of 1967
laid out the command and communications structure of the mission. As previously
mentioned, the three key officers were Captain Soroh, Lieutenant Colonel
Adekunle and Commander Rawe. Rawe would be at the centre of the communication
network which on one side consisted of the ships Lokoja, Ogoja, Benin and Enugu and on the other Captain Soroh in Nigeria, who would provide communication to naval headquarters and
merchant ships. This format would endure until circumstances permitted Nigeria to enter the Bonny River and
take direct control of the operation. Nigeria
would keep guard on circuit 201 and Captain Soroh would order each of the ships
to keep guard when appropriate on designated frequencies in voice and morse
code. Each ship was given a call sign.
Nigeria was “Beauty,” Penelope
was “Sparrow,” Kaduna was “Love” and
so on. All ships shared the call sign “Loco.”75
The Nigerian armed forces faced a range of
challenges in mounting its first combined operation. Apart from the logistical
and intelligence aspects, there was the daunting task of harmonising the roles
needed to be played by the navy and army, within a brief period of time. This
of course needed to be achieved with the backdrop of the sabotage of naval
equipment by about-to-defect naval personnel from the Eastern region. These
setbacks were perceived to have been so extensive as to convince the
secessionist side that the Nigerian Navy would be rendered impotent for a
considerable period of time.76
In a conversation between the secessionist
leader, Lieutenant Colonel Emeka Ojukwu, and the respective deputy high
commissioners of the United Kingdom and the United States in Enugu, Ojukwu had
expressed contempt when informed by both men of the rumours of a planned
federal invasion from the sea. Ojukwu insisted that the Nigerian Navy was not
patrolling off the coast of the former Eastern region, and in a separate
utterance he warned that his forces would line the bottom of the creeks of the
Niger Delta with the ships of the Nigerian Navy if they ventured close to the
coast.77
But Ojukwu was wrong.
In his 2004 memoir, Adekunle noted that due to
“the excellent relationship between the navy personnel and their foreign
suppliers,” the navy was able to replenish her stock “in a very short time”.
The navy also competently organised second level maintenance by well-trained
technical staff. And in an intelligence triumph, the navy and its service counterpart undertook to conduct their preparations under the greatest level of
secrecy. Adekunle recalled that all non-essential civilians from Ikeja
cantonment were dismissed, and a regime of mail censorship and telephone
tapping was imposed.78
While the country lacked an industrial
military complex, it was able to adapt and innovate solutions for a range of
issues using local resources. For instance, it was clear that the troops would
need life jackets. But the question arose as to the amount of buoyancy a
soldier with full kit, steel helmet and rifle would need to stay afloat. Rawe
therefore arranged for Major Tony Ochefu to bring a soldier to the naval base
in full kit. The soldier was fitted with a canvas jacket with blocks of
polystyrene and a rope was tied around him before he was dropped into the ocean
from a harbour. It took four drops to calibrate the required amount of buoyancy
by incremental additions of polystyrene.79 Also, Lokoja was provided with matting and expanded metal to cover any
soft spots on the beach to help with the landing of vehicles.80
The navy was also faced with the task of
undertaking combat exercises, as well as building up the requisite esprit de
corps with their counterparts in the army. On both accounts, Rawe would prove
influential. He had been part of “Combined Operations”
during World War 2 and he completed the commando training course near Fort
William in Scotland. Thus, his training and experiences had made him a great
believer in the need for integrated operations and the need for the branches of
the armed forces to work closely together and to know how the other arms
operated. It was also important to Rawe that the service branches trusted each
other.81 This
ethos was in keeping with the ideas set down by Julian Corbett, the British
naval historian and geostrategist who lay stress on army-navy cooperation.82
The exercises which were conducted at Tarkwa
Bay sought to go through drills in a practical manner and strove to create a
cohesion between the navy and army. Both Soroh and Adekunle wrote about the
exercises in their memoirs. Adekunle described the naval manoeuvres undertaken as
having included “ship pitching, embarkation and disembarkation in daylight and
darkness”,83 while
Soroh recalled that the army was trained in handling dinghies and outboard
engines because they needed boats for moving their men in the creeks as soon as
they were put ashore by the naval ships.84 And to solidify the sense of camaraderie between naval and
army officers, a series of joint mass dinners was organised.85
As the naval liaison officer, Rawe would succeed
in building up a solid working relationship with Adekunle, a talented but
decidedly mercurial figure, with whom many officers had difficult relations. Starting
with the Bonny operation and continuing the pattern in subsequent ones, both
men would formulate their battle plans after which they would meet to coordinate
their operational orders. As Rawe later recalled they both shared “danger and
discomfort” and had “complete trust in each other when in the face of the enemy.”86
However, Adekunle’s working relationship with
Soroh would be less than stellar. He was taken aback by Soroh’s apparent
contentment at leaving Rawe alone to draft the operational orders.87 The strained relations between
both men would cause difficulties, notably in the aftermath of the capture of
Bonny and later during the assault on Calabar when Adekunle stopped responding
to signals from Nigeria which were expected to be relayed back to
Supreme Headquarters.88
The battles
Thorough preparedness for battle does not
totally obviate the danger of having to cope with unexpected setbacks. It was Moltke
the Elder to whom the saying “No plan of operations extends with certainty
beyond the first encounter with the enemy's main strength.” Thus, the German
field marshal believed in developing a series of options for battle instead of
a single plan.89
But with its modest collection of ships
including only one landing craft tank, the Nigerian naval task force did not
have a multiplicity of options in so far as conducting the amphibious assault
was concerned.90 Yet,
as the task force began their staggered journeys, they would have been
comforted by the fact that the enemy had far fewer men and material to oppose
them.91 Each of the naval ships carried a quota of infantrymen. For instance in
addition to Adekunle, Penelope carried 40 soldiers. The MV King Jaja carried
1500 troops.
Sailing orders were given on July 22nd
of 1967, and the rendezvous of all participant vessels at Bonny Buoy happened
without a hitch at dawn on the designated D-Day: July 25th. At first daylight the
order to execute was given by Captain Soroh who began pounding enemy positions
from Nigeria as Commander Rawe on Penelope led the landing force
into the Bonny River.92
As the ships sailed past the Bonny Oil
Terminal, an expatriate manager was preparing to have his breakfast when his
steward drew his attention to the five grey “Biafran” war ships steaming upriver.
While the manager was doubtful of the ability of the secessionist side to have
acquired the vessels, his Biafran steward felt that his leader, Lieutenant
Colonel Ojukwu had made good on his promise to assemble a naval force. While
this conversation was going on Rawe in NNS
Penelope gave the order to
fire on the signal station and telegraph office to cut off Bonny’s connections
to Port Harcourt. Both men immediately took cover and when they met under the
table, they agreed that it was not the Biafran Navy after all.93
As the flotilla proceeded it encountered the
former NNS Ibadan which had been rechristened BNS Ibadan. The
captain of the secessionist ship Lieutenant Commander P.J. Odu recalled that
three ships were in the process of bombarding Bonny when contact was made.94 Ibadan was
retreating into the Bonny River in the direction of Port Harcourt when Rawe
ordered Lieutenant Commander Aduwo to detach Ogoja from the convoy and give chase.95 Ogoja opened
fire with its 3-inch and 40mm guns and Odu, in his words, with his
“comparatively puny Bofors anti-aircraft gun” replied by firing a salvo.96 But Ibadan’s gun kept jamming at intervals, “after every third or
fourth round”. So Odu decided to turn his ship around whenever it jammed to
keep its distance from Aduwo's ship.97
But it eventually entered shallow waters and
was unable to manoeuvre back to the open sea. Now stranded, it became a
stationary target.98 A cannon from Ogoja scored a direct
hit on Ibadan's engine room, creating an intense fire which melted the ladder
below deck and trapping the men there to certain death. Above, the smoke
billowed out through the funnel on the deck which was itself littered with
bodies.99 Surveying
the wreckage from his bridge, Aduwo could see Odu clearly through his
binoculars. He went on the megaphone to appeal to him to join him on Ogoja and was preparing to send a lifeboat
to collect Odu and his surviving crew.100 But Odu and his men escaped into an adjoining mangrove
swamp.101 Aduwo
re-joined the task force to report to Rawe that an enemy vessel had been sunk,
adding “I hope the captain got away -he was a friend of mine”.102
With Ibadan sunk, the bombardment of
Bonny continued with suspected enemy positions being cannonaded by Nigeria, as well as by Benin and Enugu.103 It was effective enough to disorientate and dislodge the Biafran forces
stationed there and according to Soroh, they “offered little or no resistance.”104 Commander Joe beached Lokoja
at a chosen site in the northern part of the town. According to Aduwo, this was
because of the intelligence revelation of the sparse concentrations of
secessionist soldiers in the area and also to deny the Biafran side the
possibility of being “reinforced from Port Harcourt.”105
Rawe and Adekunle found a small jetty for Penelope
and disembarked with 40 troops to minor resistance. The other ships which all
carried a quota of troops also found jetties at which the soldiers were put
ashore. Bonny was captured within 2 hours of the first salvo of cannon fired by
the Nigerian warships.106 Resistance was roughly what Rawe had expected. There were around 200
casualties, most of whom were secessionist soldiers.107 Unable to contact Soroh by radio, Rawe made
his way down the river to inform him that all was safe to enter the estuary
with the merchant ships.108
There had been some mishaps which the
opposition had been unable to exploit. For instance, both Lokoja and Benin ran
aground at different points during the operation. Lokoja became stranded while attempting to land a second batch of
troops and could not get out until high tide, while Benin suffered the same fate on the second day of the operation and
could not extricate itself for six hours. These incidents would have been disastrous
if the enemy had more formidable resources to have exploited them.109
On receiving the news that Bonny had been
captured, Major General Yakubu Gowon sent the following message of commendation
to the officer-in-charge of the operation, Captain Soroh:
“…You have got all the right to feel proud, happy,
and contented with the result of the recent combined operations at Bonny which
was your responsibility to see come off successfully. The Army Commander has
sent me a signal saying how nobly well the Navy did in the conveying, landing,
and support fire role which the Navy gave to the Army at the operations in
Bonny.”110
Bonny island was not the only location taken. Peterside
beach, which was opposite Bonny island, was captured by a party of troops who
landed in rubber dinghies and small crafts. Dawes Island, 20 miles north
of Bonny in the direction of Port Harcourt also came under federal control.111 The days after the
landing were, as Rawe recalled, “full of activity”. Penelope landed small parties of troops on various knolls of
dryland on the riverbank which was mostly mangrove swamp. These excursions up
the Bonny River went as far as the oil refinery city of Port Harcourt.112
Odu’s war diary recorded on August 4th
that Nigerian Navy SDBs came up the main channel and fired at the refinery
jetty in Port Harcourt which caused negligible damage. The ships then withdrew
to Bonny.113 But Rawe
recalled a different scenario albeit that it also ended in a withdrawal. On one
occasion, NNS Penelope, with Lt. Colonel Adekunle onboard, pushed closer
to Port Harcourt where the Shell-BP Oil refinery was situated. It came under
machine gun attack from the jetties to which Penelope made a spirited
reply with all the weapons at their disposal including the use of revolvers
when ammunition came low. The secessionists withdrew and the crew entered the
refinery. But the complex was too large to hold onto with the little manpower
they had left, which amounted to six soldiers.114
A central tenet of Julian Corbett’s theory on
sea power was his insistence that the primary goal of naval warfare must always
be to secure the command of the sea or to prevent the enemy from securing it, whether
directly or indirectly.115 This reasoning is as applicable to the contested Bonny river area as it is to
the high seas. Contrary to the inscription of “R.I.P. Biafran Navy” which
Nigerian sailors had put on the sunken ship Ibadan, the secessionist
navy was not yet toast. While cognisant that what passed as the Biafran navy
could not compete symmetrically with them, they would find that they were dealing
with a cunning and resourceful opponent which would soon come close to
regaining Bonny. The Biafran Navy found a floating dock which, as Odu recalled,
was to be used as a tool to slow down or deter the Nigerian Navy from capturing
Port Harcourt by sea. The idea was to use the floating dock as a forward
observation post or to anchor it in the main channel so that Nigerian Navy
vessels could be run aground while trying to avoid it. Sub-Lieutenant Nicholas
Ohaeri was placed in charge of the floating dock which had a small crew.116
During one of many forays up the Bonny River
with Penelope, Commander Rawe in the
company of Lt. Colonel Anthony Ochefu and some of Ochefu’s men, encountered a
Biafran tug and the floating dock after rounding a bend in the river. Penelope proceeded towards the tug and
dock at full speed but when the order to fire was given by Rawe, he was
perplexed by the continuing silence. He discovered his conscientious gunner had
dismantled the ship’s Oerlikon which he was about to clean.117
However, while Penelope evaded the machine gun fire from the floating dock, NNS Ogoja which had been accompanying Penelope scored a hit on
the tug with its 3-inch gun. The tug let go of its tow and retreated to Port
Harcourt. An exchange of gunfire followed, which ended with the surviving crew
of the floating dock either jumping over or surrendering. Ohaeri was among
those captured. The members of Penelope
then boarded the floating dock and removed parts of its vital machinery before
withdrawing after coming under a bomb attack from a helicopter.118
The presence of helicopters appropriated from
oil companies and converted to bomb-carrying aircraft were a nuisance to
Nigerian troops, and while vulnerable to Nigerian ships armed with
anti-aircraft machine guns, they could contrive ways to menace lone vessels.119
While surveying the wrecked Ibadan and clearing the ship of debris
and dead crew, Rawe and a group of his men came under attack from an enemy
helicopter which dropped a bomb alongside the wreck. With great haste, they
scrambled onto a dinghy and returned to Penelope which headed down river
back to Bonny. The helicopter, which was manned by a French crew, gave chase,
and positioned itself directly above
Penelope; a tactic that meant that its Oerlikon machine gun could not aim
at it. The helicopter began to release its payload of bombs while the Penelope zig-zagged to evade them. Rawe
kept the helicopter at a higher distance than it would have wanted by firing at
it with his FN FAL rifle. He knew that the helicopter carried a total of seven
bombs and so it was a question of counting the number of explosions which
created fountains of spray until it ceased its mission. Penelope
returned to Bonny unscathed, but the incident provided the navy with the lesson
that in order to counteract the menace of helicopters, its ships would have to
operate in pairs.120
The continuing operations proved that the navy
and army could work together as mutually supporting joint forces. The
relationship between Rawe and Adekunle was germinating into a close and
fruitful one as this undated note from Adekunle to Rawe indicates:
Bonny.
Dear Jim,
The unit Commander of the troops at Dawes
Island saw me at 1 a.m. to report that it will be essential to locate a ship at
the island even if it is for 24 hours.
The reasons are: 1. To scare away the
helicopters. 2. To revive the low morale of the troops there.
I do endorse the plea and would graciously
request you to send one of your SDBs for 24 hours only. Without being
overbearing, may I suggest Ogoja?
Thank you for your cooperation.
Benji.121
But the Nigerian forces also found themselves
needing to cope with the physical and psychological traumas associated with
war. As Rawe recalled field medical assistance was “non-existent” during the
Bonny operation, and one occasion when the federal soldiers sustained
casualties, he remembered that Adekunle “borrowed a bottle of brandy and went
around the deck lifting the heads of the dying men saying there is nothing we
can do for you but inviting them to have a drink before they left”. He also
noted one disadvantage of giving the soldiers life belts. The bodies of “those
who had been killed during the initial landing drifted up and down the river
with the tide, often with the seagulls sitting on their heads, and this did
nothing for the troop’s morale.”122
Two weeks after the start of the Bonny
operation, the navy could claim a successful landing, the reclamation of
Nigerian territory, as well as the degrading of the enemy's manpower and
resources. Over one hundred prisoners were taken to the naval base in Apapa.
Apart from equipment such as those taken out of the floating dock, Rawe and his
crew salvaged the 40mm gun and engines found on Ibadan.123
Although the Nigerian navy and army had
demonstrated an amphibious operations capability, the achievement at Bonny came
perilously close to being undone two months later when secessionist forces
launched “Operation Sea Jack”, a determined attempt to retake the town.124 One contributing factor
for this malaise was arguably the breakdown in the relationship between Captain
Soroh and Lieutenant Colonel Adekunle, while Rawe, the naval liaison officer, was
away on leave. Adekunle claimed, not without merit, that the navy was not
making aggressive patrols of the Bonny River and at one point sent Soroh an
irate signal which asserted that if Soroh was not prepared to order aggressive
patrols of the Bonny River that he had better go back to Lagos as naval ships
were not supposed to adorn the area for their good looks only. Adekunle felt
that this lack of aggression had emboldened the Biafran navy to send boats on
attack runs down the river to shell Bonny.125
But the fault did not reside only with the
navy. The rapid expansion of the Nigerian Army had meant that there was a
problem of finding senior officers to command battalions. This was compounded
by the fact that the 3rd Infantry Division had withdrawn its best officers,
first to stage a landing at Escravos to counter the secessionist invasion of
the Mid-West in August 1967, and secondly, experienced officers and men were
transferred from the Bonny theatre to prepare for the landings in Sapele, Warri
and Koko. Those who were left were mainly poorly trained and poorly led.126
Biafran intelligence on the number of naval
ships operating on the Bonny river was used effectively. Shelling operations on
Bonny via converted vessels were undertaken at night when the numbers of ships
on patrol were reduced. The number of these missions was particularly
pronounced when Ogoja, the most feared component of the Nigerian fleet,
was absent from the area.127
In late September 1967 while the federal side
was expelling secessionist forces from the Mid-West, Bonny was attacked when
left in the hands of the 7th battalion of the Third Infantry Division commanded
by one Lieutenant Colonel Abubakar. Neighbouring Peterside only had a company
commanded by Captain Bello. At Peterside, a battalion-strong group of
secessionist soldiers had been landed after been conveyed there by barges and launches.128
The federal side was vastly outnumbered by the
secessionist attackers and in danger of being overwhelmed when naval
headquarters was informed. NNS Nigeria was despatched and was joined
in the battle by Ogoja. Soroh
recalled arriving in the midst of a furious gunbattle in which Peterside was
ablaze and some federal combatants were being literally “pushed into the water”.129 In the frantic and
desperate circumstances of the confrontation, Aduwo had to refuse a request
made by a Federal troop commander to take him onboard Ogoja, compelling
the officer to stand and fight.130 The enemy was eventually driven back largely through the firepower provided by
naval warships.
According to Soroh’s memoir, Abubakar admitted
that the timely intervention of the Nigerian Navy had spared the Federal army a
defeat at the hands of the Biafran forces.131 Bonny and Peterside were held on to, but the
secessionists took over previous advance positions held by the Federal side
including Dawes Island and they were able to construct a boom across the Bonny
River.132 Biafran
forces would not be removed from the approaches to Bonny until January 1968,
and Port Harcourt did not fall until May of that year.133
Conclusion
The operation in Bonny was a triumph of James
Rawe’s ability to process prior experience into a practical plan of action
which the officers and men of the Nigerian navy capably executed. The plan,
which he had insisted be kept as “straightforward as possible,” successfully
followed what at the time was the conventional approach to staging an
amphibious assault, that is, by using a concentration of troops to force a
landing in the presence of the enemy. While subsequent operations presented greater
challenges related to unfavourable topography, the confined circumstances of
riverine warfare, and enemy deceptive tactics, surmounting the hurdle of
landing forces on enemy territory presented a tremendous psychological boost to
the federal forces and a commensurate blow to the secessionist military.134
It demonstrated that the navy and the army
could mount a successful combined operation and paved the way for further
landings, all of which provided the basis for the encirclement and eventual
defeat of the secessionist state.
The capture of oil installations at Bonny
proved to the oil companies, most notably Shell-BP which controlled over 80 per
cent of oil production, that the federal government and not the secessionist
side would control access to petroleum in the Niger Delta. This prevented the
Biafran side from being in a position to use monies garnered from oil revenues to
pay for the import of arms and ammunition.135
The combination of landings and blockade were
of inestimable importance. As Rawe would later opine: “If it were not for the
Third Division and the navy capturing all the ports and coastline held by the
rebels, the course of the war would have been very different. Ojukwu’s
propaganda had moved world opinion on his side. If he had ports available for
the import of heavy weapons, (supplied) by foreign powers such as France, and
if the navy had not stopped his export of oil, the Federal government may have
found the rebels very hard to beat.”136
Adeyinka Makinde is a Visiting Lecturer in Law
at the University of Westminster in the United Kingdom. He has a research
interest in military history. He is the son of the Late Captain Emmanuel
Makinde. F.S.S., who served as a Nigerian naval officer between 1964 and 1982.
Notes.
1. Nigerian
Navy Ordinance, 1956 (No.28 of 1956). This was followed by the Nigerian Navy
(Establishment of Force) Notice, 1958 by which the Governor-General
“established the Nigerian Navy with effect from the 1st day of May 1958.”
2. Excluding
the coast of what was the British Southern Cameroons which is now part of
southern Cameroon.
3. Stapleton,
Timothy. “The Origins of the Nigerian and Ghana Navies (c.1930–1960)” in
Stapleton, Timothy (Ed), African Navies:
Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, Routledge, 2022.
4. Ibid.
5.
Correspondent. “Royal Nigerian Navy,” Daily
Telegraph, Monday, August 10th, 1959.
Report that the
Federal House of Representatives had passed a bill to give the Nigerian Navy
the prefix “Royal” with the Queen’s permission.
6. Nigeria
became a republic on October 1st, 1963.
7. It should be
noted that the old marine departments did ferry British forces embarked on
colonial campaigns of subjugation including those concerned with the conquest
of the Benin Kingdom and the Aro Expedition.
Also see
Osuntokun, Akinjide. “Anglo-French Occupation and the Provisional Partition of
the Cameroons 1914-1916”, Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, Vol.7,
No.4, June 1975.
8. “Nigerian
Crisis 1966: The meeting of the Supreme Military Council, held at Aburi, Accra,
Ghana, 4-5 January 1967”, Vol. Six, The
Government Printer Enugu, 1967.
See newsreel “Ghana: Nigerian Military Governors Conclude Secret Talks on
Constitutional Problems”, Reuters News, January 6th, 1967.
9. See newsreel
“Nigeria After the Coup”, ITN
News, January 19th, 1966.
See also the
newsreel “Nigeria: Head of Military Government, Major-General
Ironsi, Outlines How Country Will Be Governed”, Reuters News, January 18th, 1966.
10. Rawe,
James. That Reminds Me. Privately
published memoir, 2021.
11. Soroh,
Nelson. A Sailor's Dream: Autobiography
of Rear Admiral Nelson Bossman Soroh, Crucible Publishers, Lagos, 2001.
12. The decree,
which was issued in March 1967, modified section 18(1) of the Interpretation
Act of 1964.
13.
Commonwealth Correspondent. “Pay now or no oil, says Nigeria,” The Guardian, June 15th, 1967.
See also:
Meisler,
Stanley. “Nigerians Shell Ship in Biafran Port Blockade,” The Los Angeles Times, July 5th, 1967.
The
"Reigel", a Panamanian-registered vessel, was hit on its quarter-deck
and the crew detained after it had left Bonny. It was later escorted back to
the naval base in Apapa, Lagos. The incident occurred a few days before the
formal start of the "Police Action" which would later become a
full-blown civil war.
14. Rawe,
James. That Reminds Me. 2021.
15. Speller,
Ian and Tuck, Christopher. Amphibious
Warfare: Strategy and Tactics: The Theory and Practice of Amphibious Operations
in the 20th Century. The History Press Ltd, 2001.
16. Ibid.
Examples are
the Normandy Landings of 1944 (“assault”), Dieppe and St Nazaire in 1942
(“raid”), the Dunkirk evacuation in 1940 (“withdrawal”), and feints conducted
by the U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Navy between January and February prior to
the Gulf War in 1991 (“demonstration”).
17. Ibid
18. Ishizu,
Tomoyuki. "Amphibious Warfare: Theory and Practice." International Forum on War History, 2014.
19. The Naval
War College Nigeria which is located in the city of Calabar was established in
2017.
20. Marder,
Arthur. Operation Menace: The Dakar
Expedition and the Dudley North Affair. Oxford University Press, 1976.
21. Lloyd,
Cliff. Operation Ironclad: The British
Invasion of Madagascar. History & Latte, 2017.
22. Gelb,
Norman. Desperate Venture: The Story of
Operation Torch, the Allied Invasion of North Africa. William Morrow &
Co, 1992.
23.
Commonwealth Correspondent. “Steam Up Over Man O’ War Bay: Nigerian objections
to ‘base’,” The Guardian, Friday,
April 1st, 1960.
24. Rawe,
James. That Reminds Me, 2021.
Lieutenant
Commander Rawe in command of the original NNS Nigeria an Algerine-class
minesweeper which was formerly HMS Hare, ferried Nigerian troops to the
British Cameroons on several trips.
Both Rawe and
Navy Lieutenant Nelson Soroh recalled naval and army officers meeting onboard Nigeria.
Rawe commended the “considerable esprit de corps” of the army officers, while
Soroh noted that the officers shared their service experiences. There was a
ship’s exercise off Victoria (now Limbe).
See Soroh,
Nelson. A Sailor's Dream. 2001.
The Ghanaian
leader Kwame Nkrumah had a disagreement with his former ally Sylvio Olympio
over the status of the former German Togoland which came under British control
after the defeat of Germany in the Great War. The territory was absorbed into
the Gold Coast and later Ghana after a plebiscite. While Olympio wanted the
land returned to Togo, Nkrumah insisted that Togo should merge with Ghana.
Nigeria pledged to help Olympio resist an invasion by Ghana, but since it was
unlikely that Dahomey (now Benin) would allow Nigerian troops through its
territory, the only means of aiding Togo would have been by orchestrating a
seaborne landing. Lieutenant Commander James Rawe journeyed to England to order
fresh supplies of ammunition and returned to Nigeria to plan a clandestine trip
to Togo to survey the coastal area in order to determine suitable landing
sites. However, his trip was aborted, and the planned operation cancelled when
Olympio was assassinated in January 1963.
25. The issue,
which persists, has been addressed by several former Nigerian Navy officers
including Captain Ian Wright and Commodore Olatunde Oladimeji.
See: Wright,
Ian. “Recent Developments in African Navies,” Naval Forces, Vol. 9, No. 2, 1988.
See also:
Oladimeji, Olatunde A. "Where Are the African Navies Going?", Proceedings, U.S.
Naval Institute, Vol. 116/3/1,045, March 1990.
26. Makinde,
Adeyinka. “Captain James Rawe - Obituary”, adeyinkamakindeblogspot dot
com, April 17th, 2023.
With the
backing of the British High Commissioner, Rawe was advised by the British
military attaché to leave the Nigerian Navy immediately after the first coup.
But he refused, arguing that his resignation would injure the good name of
Britain and potentially undermine the fragile military government.
27. Telegraph
Obituaries. “Captain James Rawe, naval officer who served on D-Day and
later helped to develop the Nigerian navy – obituary,” Daily Telegraph, May 30th,
2023.
Rawe delayed
his early retirement in 1967 at the request of Major General Yakubu Gowon. In
1974, he won damages against the author John de St. Jorre and the publishers of
de St. Jorre’s book The Nigerian Civil
War for implying that he had been a mercenary for the federal side,
pointing out that he had served for many years in the Nigerian Navy prior to
the outbreak of war and that his salary had been paid by Her Majesty’s overseas
civil service. Rawe had been the first person, Nigerian or expatriate, to sign
up for the Nigerian Naval Defence Force.
28. Rawe,
James. That Reminds Me. 2021.
29. Captain James Rawe via e-mail communication with Timothy Rawe, February 20th, 2023.
30. Rawe,
James. “Landing by sea on enemy-held territory.” Paper prepared for the Supreme
Headquarters of the Federal Military Government of Nigeria, 1967.
31. Rawe,
James. “Landing by sea on enemy-held territory,” 1967.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid
38. Ibid.
39. E-mail
communication with Timothy Rawe, February 20th, 2023.
40. Rawe,
James. “Landing by sea on enemy-held territory,” 1967.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid.
47. Prettie,
Terence. “Britain still trying to keep up flow of oil from Nigeria,” The Guardian, July
11th, 1967.
The
secessionist government demanded that Shell-BP, a British multinational company,
pay oil revenues into the treasury of what had been Nigeria’s Eastern region
and it agreed to make an interim payment scheduled for July 15th. The Nigerian
government denounced the decision to pay dues as “ill-timed and unfortunate.”
But payment was purportedly held up because of Biafra’s insistence that
Shell-BP pay in a currency other than Sterling. When the company’s managing
director, Stanley Gray travelled from Lagos to Port Harcourt on July 23rd, he
was summoned to Enugu, the capital city of Biafra and promptly arrested. He was
later released and returned to Lagos where he held a press conference to
announce that Shell-BP would withhold payment until the following year or when
“the situation becomes normal.”
For an
assessment of the dilemma faced by Shell-BP see:
Raji, A.O.Y.
and Abejide, T.S. “Oil and Biafra: An Assessment of Shell-BP’s Dilemma
During the Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970”. Kuwait Chapter of Arabian Journal of
Business and Management Review Vol. 2, No.11. July 2013.
48. For
instance, the official neutrality of the United States and its policy of
imposing an arms embargo on both federal and secessionist sides posed a problem
for obtaining supplies of the three-inch shells used by NNS Ogoja, an American-made patrol boat
which Nigeria had obtained from the Netherlands as part of the deal to build
the frigate which would be named NNS Nigeria.
Rawe overcame the problem by getting the U.S. military attaché in Lagos to
arrange for the required shells to be sent to the Netherlands, following up by
liaising with the Dutch ambassador to Nigeria to ensure that the ammunition was
delivered by air.
49. Rawe,
James. “Landing by sea on enemy-held territory,” 1967.
In his memoir,
Rawe recalled that during the crisis, Wey and he had initially decided not to
aggravate the situation by recalling
Ibadan from its station in Calabar. However, when they ordered it back to
Lagos it conveniently broke down and was eventually coopted as a Biafran vessel
after the declaration of secession.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
53. Naval Order
(No.1) of 1967, Copy No.2.
54. Naval Order
(No.1) of 1967.
55. Ibid
56. Both Soroh
and Adekunle wrote memoirs.
See:
Soroh, Nelson. A Sailor's Dream: Autobiography of Rear
Admiral Nelson Bossman Soroh. Crucible Publishers. 2001.
Adekunle,
Benjamin. The Nigeria-Biafra War Letters:
A Soldier's Story (Vol. 1). Phoenix Publishing Group. 2004.
57. Naval Order
(No.1) of 1967.
58. Ibid.
Nigeria had a high
freeboard which made it impossible for her to depress her four-inch guns low
enough to fire back at short range.
59. The
vulnerability of large vessels engaged in naval combat was vividly illustrated
three months after the landing at Bonny when INS Eilat, an Israeli Z-class destroyer which was formerly the Royal
Navy’s HMS Zealous, was sunk by an
Egyptian Komar-class missile boat positioned 13 miles away within the harbour
of Port Said during the Israeli-Egyptian War of Attrition.
For an appraisal
of the sinking of INS Eilat see
Colvin, Robert D. “Aftermath of the Elath”, Proceedings, U.S. Naval Institute, Vol. 95/10/800, October
1969.
The captain of Eilat, Commander Yitzhak Shoshan wrote a
book published in Hebrew:
Shoshan,
Yitzhak. The Last Battle of the Destroyer
INS Eilat Shoshan. Ma'ariv Publishing House, 1993.
60. Naval Order
(No.1) of 1967.
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid.
67. Ibid.
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid.
70. Ibid.
71. Ibid.
72. Ibid.
73. Ibid.
74. Ibid.
75. Ibid.
Lokoja was “Parrot,” Ogoja was “Dog,” Enugu was “Cat,” Kaduna
was “Love,” and Benin was “Tiger.”
Also, Beecroft, the operations base
in Apapa, was “Ginger,” while naval headquarters, COMNAV (H.Q,) was “Uncle.”
76. Osakwe,
Chukwuma C. C. and Udeagbala, Lawrence Okechukwu. "Naval Military
Operations in Bonny during the Nigerian Civil War 1967-1970", Advances in Historical Studies Vol.04,
No.3. 2015.
77. Ibid.
The Deputy High
Commissioners were respectively the Briton James Parker and the American Bob
Bernard.
78. Adekunle,
Benjamin. The Nigeria-Biafra War Letters:
A Soldier's Story (Vol. 1). Phoenix Publishing Group, Atlanta, 2004.
79. Rawe,
James. That Reminds Me. 2021.
80. Naval Order
(No.1) of 1967.
81. E-mail
communication with Timothy Rawe, February 20th, 2023.
82. Corbett,
Julian S. Some Principles of Maritime
Strategy. Longmans, Green & Co., 1918.
83. Adekunle,
Benjamin. A Soldier's Story. 2004.
84. Soroh,
Nelson. A Sailor's Dream. 2001.
85. Adekunle,
Benjamin. A Soldier's Story. 2004.
86. Rawe,
James. That Reminds Me. 2021.
87. Ibid.
88. Soroh,
Nelson. A Sailor's Dream. 2001.
89. Von Moltke,
Helmut (The Elder). “Second Part: Article from 1871 on Strategy,” Moltke’s Military Works: II. Activity as
Chief of the Army General Staff in Peacetime, Ernst Siegfried Mittler und
Sohn, 1900.
90. Rawe did
not dwell on back up plans in his paper and operation order. He was clear about
the circumstances in which a landing could not be made and insisted that the
plan be a “straightforward” one.
91. “The side
with the most ships almost always wins”. See Tangredi, Sam J. “Bigger
Fleets Win.” Proceedings, Vol.
149/1/1,439, U.S. Naval Institute, January 2023.
92. Rawe,
James. That Reminds Me. 2021.
93. Ibid.
94. Odu, P.J. The Future that Vanished: A Biafran Story.
Xlibris, 2009.
While some
sources provide that the sea battle occurred on the second day of the
operation, that is, on July 26th, 1967, Rawe’s memoir places the confrontation
as occurring shortly after the commencement of the invasion. This is
corroborated by Odu who, having established a patrol routine “from Port
Harcourt to Bonny and out to sea,” recorded that he encountered three Nigerian
Navy ships and a troop ship in the process of assaulting Bonny during the
morning of July 25th.
95. Rawe,
James. That Reminds Me. 2021.
96. Odu, P.J. The Future that Vanished. 2009.
97. Ibid.
98. Ibid.
99. Rawe,
James. That Reminds Me. 2021.
100. Osakwe and Udeagbala. "Naval Military
Operations in Bonny.” 2015.
101. Odu, P.J. The Future that Vanished. 2009.
102. Rawe,
James. That Reminds Me. 2021.
Aduwo and Odu
had been friends within the Nigerian navy. According to the authors Femi Omosefunmi and Foluso Akinlonu, when
Odu was made ineligible to pursue his choice as a specialist naval navigator on
account of his eyesight, Aduwo waived his nomination as a specialist in the
area of communication in favour of Odu. Odu did not mention such an arrangement
in his memoir. Noting that the “Long C” course is the most “most prestigious”
course available to young executive (warfare) officers and is open only to “the
brightest”, he was not certain as to how he came to be selected, speculating
that his frequent benefactor Commodore Alexander Kennedy, the last British Chief of
Naval Staff, may have engineered it, or that it might have been due to the fact
that he had graduated at the top of the New Commonwealth class at Dartmouth.
See Omosefunmi,
Femi and Akinlonu, Foluso. 30 Days in
Power, 4 Years in Command the Story of Vice Admiral Akin Aduwo. Advent
Communication Limited, 1997.
103. Ibid.
104. Soroh,
Nelson. A Sailor's Dream. 2001.
105. Osakwe and
Udeagbala. "Naval Military Operations in Bonny.” 2015.
106. Rawe, James. That Reminds Me. 2021.
107. James Rawe via e-mail communication with Timothy Rawe, February 20th, 2023.
108. Rawe,
James. That Reminds Me. 2021.
109. Yusuf,
Idris Uru. The Nigerian Navy: Development
Amidst Contemporary Challenges. Daily Graphics Ltd, 2015.
110. Soroh, Nelson. A Sailor's Dream. 2001.
111. Ibid.
112. Rawe,
James. That Reminds Me. 2021.
113. Odu, P.J. The Future that Vanished. 2009.
On August 9th,
Odu recorded another Nigerian mission towards the refinery jetty, identifying Ogoja and one SDB as the attackers. BNS
Ikwerre, a former Nigerian Ports
Authority tugboat, “attempted to block the enemy but was seriously damaged.”
However, Ogoja, he wrote, came within
the range of small arms fire and Biafran troops reportedly mowed down “up to 50
Nigerian soldiers” on the upper deck of the ship. Odu does not say if the
Nigerian soldiers, who would presumably have been armed, were returning fire.
114. Rawe,
James. That Reminds Me. 2021.
115. Corbett,
Julian S. Some Principles of Maritime
Strategy. Longmans, Green & Co., 1918.
116. Odu, P.J. The Future that Vanished. 2009.
117. Rawe,
James. That Reminds Me. 2021.
118. Ibid.
119. Ibid.
120. Ibid.
121. Archive of
Captain James Rawe.
122. Rawe,
James. That Reminds Me. 2021.
123. Ibid.
See newsreel “Second Group of War
Prisoners Arrive in Lagos”, Reuters
News, August 6th, 1967.
124. Odu, P.J. The Future that Vanished. 2009.
“Operation Sea
Jack” commenced on September 25th, 1967. Wrote P.J. Odu: “It was designed to
recapture Bonny from Nigerian troops.”
125. Rawe,
James. That Reminds Me. 2021.
Adekunle went as
far as to say that “it was only when Soroh was present that the Biafran boats
had the guts to come down and shell Bonny.”
126. Ibid.
127. Odu, P.J. The Future that Vanished. 2009.
128. Udeagbala,
Lawrence Okechukwu. “A Comparative Study of the Nigerian and Biafran Navies
During the Nigerian Civil War” in Stapleton, Timothy (Ed), African Navies: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives,
Routledge, 2022.
129. Soroh,
Nelson. A Sailor's Dream. 2001.
130. Rawe,
James. That Reminds Me. 2021.
131. Soroh,
Nelson. A Sailor's Dream. 2001.
132. Rawe,
James. That Reminds Me. 2021.
133. Odu wrote
of his pride in Port Harcourt not being “taken from the sea”.
134. The
operation to capture Warri, Koko and Sapele in September 1967 involved the
naval vessels navigating the 20-mile-long Nana creek. Rawe recalled in his
memoir that “if the leading vessel sunk or the creek was blocked by rebels,
there would be no room for the other ships to advance, and if a craft in the
rear was disabled, the ships ahead, even if able to turn, would be unable to
pass the disabled vessel.”
The Calabar
operation in October 1967 was an assault against Biafran soldiers in well-dug
positions on high ground overlooking the river where the landing would take
place, while the final assault on Oron in March 1968, as with the
aforementioned operations, was rife with the threat of ambushes, booby traps,
river mines and recordings of intermittent machine gun fire that came from tape
recorders which the Biafrans had placed in trees.
135. Duyile,
William Abiodun. “Nature and Impact of Involvement of the Navy in the Nigerian
Civil War, 1967-1970”. International
Journal of Naval History, 2016.
136. Rawe,
James. That Reminds Me. 2021.
© Adeyinka
Makinde (2023).
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